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The war in the Balkans (1991-1999) demonstrated dramatically the 
European dependence on the United States in military issues. The EU was 
paralyzed by the events in the Balkans and showed a startling incapacity to deal 
with this crisis. Even in 2005, some critics argue that, though the European Union 
(EU) has become an economic superpower, it is still a negligible player in the 
realm of security and defense issues. This thesis demonstrates that since 1998 
the EU has developed a credible security and defense policy and the capabilities 
and the mindset successfully to conduct military missions. The thesis argues that 
the EU forces, EUFOR, will successfully implement the 1995 Dayton Accords in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the wake of NATO’s Implementation and Stabilization 
Forces (IFOR/SFOR).  
Following an overview of the development of the European Security and 
Defense Policy (ESDP), the thesis highlights how the ESDP was put into practice 
for the first time during operation CONCORDIA in Macedonia in 2003. The thesis 
further examines the challenges that EUFOR has to face in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina today and it outlines the ways and means that the EU and EUFOR 
chose to deal with the challenges in the country. The thesis summarizes the 
findings to show how they support the argument that EUFOR will successfully 





























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE......................................................... 1 
B. ARGUMENT AND MAJOR QUESTIONS ............................................ 2 
C. METHODOLOGY................................................................................. 3 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE 
POLICY........................................................................................................... 5 
A. THE PROCESS FROM MAASTRICHT TO NICE ................................ 5 
1. Background.............................................................................. 5 
2. Institutional and Conceptual Achievements ......................... 6 
3. Findings.................................................................................. 11 
B. THE CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT AFTER NICE ......................... 13 
1. The Military Capabilities........................................................ 13 
a. The European Capabilities Action Plan .................... 13 
b. The Headline Goal 2010.............................................. 15 
2. The 2003 “Berlin-Plus” Arrangement................................... 17 
3. The 2003 European Security Strategy ................................. 18 
4. Findings.................................................................................. 19 
III. THE OPERATION “CONCORDIA” IN MACEDONIA .................................. 23 
A. BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 23 
B. OBJECTIVES..................................................................................... 24 
C. RISK ASSESSMENT ......................................................................... 26 
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE...................................... 27 
1. NATO’s Command and Control Structure ........................... 27 
2. CONCORDIA’s Command and Control Structure ............... 29 
E. FORCE COMPOSITION .................................................................... 32 
F. END OF MISSION.............................................................................. 33 
G. FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED ............................................. 34 
IV. THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ................................... 39 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND .......................................................... 39 
1. From the Ottomans to Tito.................................................... 39 
2. From Tito’s Death to Dayton................................................. 42 
3. Findings.................................................................................. 48 
B. THE DAYTON ACCORDS: THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ....... 49 
1. Civilian Aspects ..................................................................... 49 
2. Military Aspects ..................................................................... 50 
C. THE DEVELOPMENT AFTER DAYTON ........................................... 52 
1. Civilian Aspects ..................................................................... 52 
a. Constitutional Issues.................................................. 52 
b. Social, Political, and Economical Development 
and the Reinforcement of the High Representative . 54 
 viii
c. From the UN International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) to the European Police Mission (EUPM) ........ 59 
2. Military Aspects – From IFOR until the End of SFOR......... 61 
3. Findings.................................................................................. 65 
V. THE EUROPEAN FORCES IN BOSNIA: OPERATION “ALTHEA”............ 69 
A. BACKGROUND ................................................................................. 69 
B. OBJECTIVES..................................................................................... 71 
1. Political Objectives................................................................ 71 
2. Military Objectives ................................................................. 72 
C. RISK ASSESSMENT ......................................................................... 74 
D. ALTHEA`S COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE................... 75 
E. FORCE COMPOSITION .................................................................... 80 
F. LIAISON AND OBSERVATION TEAMS ........................................... 81 
G. THE DEVELOPMENT AFTER 2 DECEMBER 2004.......................... 83 
H. FINDINGS .......................................................................................... 86 
VI. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 91 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 95 




LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1. NATO’s and the EU’s Political-Military Framework............................. 12 
Figure 2. NATO’s “European” Command and Control Structure (Apr. 2005)..... 28 
Figure 3. Concordia’s Command and Control Structure .................................... 31 
Figure 4. Front structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1993 .................... 44 
Figure 5. Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton in comparison to the front 
structure at the end of the war............................................................ 51 
Figure 6. IFOR Zones of Operation ................................................................... 62 
Figure 7. Althea’s Command and Control Structure .......................................... 77 

































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
 
ACO   Allied Command Operations  
ACT   Allied Command Transformation 
BiH   Bosnian and Herzegovina 
CC   Component Command 
CFSP   Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CONOPS  Concept of Operations 
COS   Chief of Staff 
CIS   Command and Information System 
DSACEUR  Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
ECAP   European Capability Action Plan  
EU   European Union 
EU CAFAO   European Union Customs and Financial Assistance Office 
EUCE   European Union Command Element 
EU FCDR  European Union Force Commander 
EUFOR  European Force 
EUFOR HQ  European Force Headquarters 
EUMC  European Union Military Committee 
EUMM  European Union Monitoring Mission 
EUMS   European Union Military Staff 
EU OHQ  European Union Operational Headquarters 
EU OPCDR  European Union Operation Commander 
EUPM   European Union Police Mission 
EUPT   European Union Planning Team 
EUSC   European Union Satellite Center 
EUSG   European Union Staff Group 
EUSR   European Union Special Representative 
ESDP   European Security and Defense Policy 
ESS   European Security Strategy 
 xii
FCA   Former Crisis Area 
IJC    Independent Judicial Commission 
IPU   Integrated Police Unit 
IPTF   International Police Task Force 
JFC   Joint Forces Command 
JHQ   Joint Headquarters 
HDZ   Croatian Democratic Community 
HFC   Helsinki Force Catalogue 
HHC   Helsinki Headline Catalogue 
HHG   Helsinki Headline Goal 
HR   High Representative 
IC   International Community 
ICTY    International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
IFOR   Implementation Force 
IMS   International Military Staff 
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
KFOR   Kosovo Force 
LOT   Liaison and Observation Team 
MC   Military Committee 
MILREP  Military Representative 
MIP   Mission Implementation Plan 
MNTF   Multinational Task Force 
NAC   North Atlantic Council 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NLA   National Liberation Army 
OHR   Office of the High Representative 
OPLAN  Operational Plan 
OPP   Operational Planning Process 
OSCE   Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PfP   Partnership for Peace 
 xiii
PIC   Peace Implementation Council 
PSC   Political and Security Committee 
RHQ   Regional Headquarters 
ROC   Regional Operation Center 
RS    Republika Srpska 
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SDA   Bosnian Party of Democratic Action 
SDS   Serbian Democratic Party 
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
SFOR   Stabilization Force 
SIPA    State Information and Protection Agency 
SOFA   Status of Forces Agreement 
SOP   Standard Operating Procedures 
TOA   Transfer of Authority 
UN   United Nations 
UNPROFOR  United Nations Protection Force 
VT   Verification Team 
WEU   Western European Union 

































I would like to thank Professor Donald Abenheim and Colonel (GS) Hans-
Eberhard Peters for their support and help as thesis advisors. I would also like to 
thank Admiral (ret.) Rainer Feist who openly shared his enormous treasure of 
experience and knowledge with me. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, 
Barbara. Her patience and understanding were the basis for the success of my 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Some critics argue that though the European Union (EU) has become a 
strong economic power, it is still a negligible player in the realm of security and 
defense issues because of political disarray and military incapacity. The purpose 
of this thesis is to show that the EU is truly an economic superpower but also a 
reputable player on the international political and military stage. I will suggest that 
the EU has developed the capabilities and the mindset successfully to conduct 
military missions on a low to medium level of the conflict cycle. 
The topic is highly significant for two reasons. First, the credibility and 
future progress of the EU’s Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is strongly 
dependent on the success of the European Force (EUFOR) and operation 
ALTHEA in Bosnia. Since the end of the 1990s, the EU and its members have 
put a lot of effort into the development of the ESDP. A successful conduction of 
the mission in Bosnia would support the positive development since 1999, 
support coherence among the member states, and encourage members to 
continue to strengthen their military capabilities and their willingness to take on 
further responsibility. A failure of EUFOR in Bosnia, however, would most likely 
have devastating effects, not only on the credibility of the EU in general, but also 
on the willingness of its member states to put further effort into the development 
of the European Security and Defense Policy. 
Second, the outcome of the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina will 
greatly influence the future relationship with the United States in the realm of 
security and defense. When the war in the Balkans broke out in 1991, the 
European states were not prepared to deal with the challenges they faced on 
their own continent. Consequently, the war unfolded without EU intervention and 
it was finally necessary for the United States to stabilize the region. Since the end 
of the Cold War, and particularly after 11 September 2001, an intense U.S. 
presence in the Balkans is not in the interest of the United States, whose future 
strategic challenges will mainly be in the Pacific region and in the war against 
2 
terrorism. Consequently, if the EU wants to stay a serious partner of the United 
States it must demonstrate its capability to take care of its own problems and 
challenges. 
 
B. ARGUMENT AND MAJOR QUESTIONS 
The war in the Balkans demonstrated dramatically the European 
dependence on the United States in military issues. The EU was paralyzed by 
the events in the Balkans and showed a startling incapacity to deal with them. 
Since then, however, the EU has made significant progress in the areas of 
security and defense policy. The member states became aware that it takes more 
than just economic power to be a major player on the international political stage. 
After the European Council in Cologne in 1999 the EU created the structures, 
institutions, concepts, and capabilities necessary for a credible European 
Security and Defense Policy that made possible the first EU-led military operation 
in 2003. Indeed, recent achievements, like the draft Constitutional Treaty and the 
European Security Strategy (ESS), and recent projects, like the Headline Goal 
2010, indicate that the EU intends to widen its scope even further from low- and 
medium-intensity operations to high-intensity operations. I argue that today the 
EU has not only the general mindset to intervene militarily but also the 
capabilities and sufficient experience that will enable EUFOR to face the 
challenges in Bosnian and Herzegovina and to successfully implement the 
Dayton Accords during operation ALTHEA. 
To elucidate my thesis I will address the following questions: 
• What capabilities, structures, and institutions has the EU developed 
in the realm of its security and defense policy?  
• Has the EU developed sufficient experience in the field of military 
operations? 
• What challenges does EUFOR face in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
• What ways and means will the EU and EUFOR use to deal with 
these challenges?  
3 
C. METHODOLOGY 
I begin by describing the development of the ESDP from the proclamation 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in Maastricht in 1992 until 
today. The discussion includes an examination of the pertinent EU institutional 
and conceptual achievements as well as an analysis of the EU’s development of 
military capabilities.  I pay particular attention to the 2003 Berlin-Plus 
arrangement between NATO and the EU and to the European Security Strategy.  
The third chapter describes how the ESDP and the related institutional 
and conceptual achievements were put into practice for the first time in a military 
operation during operation CONCORDIA in Macedonia. Here I stress in particular 
how the EU made use of the Berlin-Plus arrangement and what lessons the EU 
learned from its first military operation. 
Chapter IV examines the challenges that EUFOR has to face in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina today. The chapter begins with a brief history of the Balkan 
state before the signing of the Dayton Accords in December 1995, followed by a 
short summary of the Accords, I then concentrate on the social, political, 
economical and military development in the country after Dayton. 
Chapter V outlines the ways and means that the EU and EUFOR chose to 
deal with the challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I introduce the overarching 
EU approach to the country, the military objectives, and the military structure and 
force composition. Finally, I describe recent developments in the country after the 
transfer of authority (TOA) from NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) to EUFOR 
on 2 December 2004. 
My conclusion summarizes the findings in preceding chapters to show 
how they support my thesis that the EU is now capable not only economically but 
also in terms of its security and defense. The EU and its forces, EUFOR, are now 
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5 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND 
DEFENSE POLICY  
A. THE PROCESS FROM MAASTRICHT TO NICE 
1. Background 
Until the beginning of the 1990s the general assumption among the 
Western European countries was that defense and security functions were to be 
carried out solely by NATO.  With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, 
the members of the newly created European Union for the first time transposed a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) into their common principles and 
objectives.1 The CFSP became the second pillar of the “Maastricht’s Greek 
Temple” and included the eventual framing of a common defense policy which 
could in time lead to a common defense. Because the European Union (EU) 
lacked its own military capabilities, the Western European Union (WEU) would 
become the organization to elaborate and implement decisions and actions with 
defense implications. The WEU accepted this challenge and gave itself an 
operational role by formulating the Petersberg Tasks in June 1992.  
Apart from contributing to the common defense in accordance with Article 
V of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, military 
units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of the WEU, could now 
also be employed for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks, and 
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Besides 
the incorporation of the Petersberg Tasks into the Treaty in Amsterdam in 1997 
(Art. 17.2) a real defense policy was not part of the EU’s agenda until 1999.2  The 
operational powerlessness of the Europeans in the Balkans triggered the British 
to change their thinking in the field of European defense. The “Blair initiative” led 
to bilateral talks between Great Britain and France in St. Malo in December 1998. 
The idea was to give the EU the military capability and to express the real 
intention to act autonomously and to take on Petersberg missions.  
                                            
1 Antonio Missiroli, “Background of ESDP (1954-1999),“ Institute for Security Studies,  
http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/02-am.pdf (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
2 Ibid. 
6 
Supported by the recent events in the Balkans, particularly the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo, that idea was embraced by all 15 members of the EU in 
Cologne in June 1999.  They determined that “the EU will be given the necessary 
means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common 
European policy on security and defense…the Union must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to 
use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises 
without prejudice to actions by NATO.”3 These decisions were elaborated in 
Helsinki in December 1999, further developed in Santa Maria da Feira in June 
2000, and finally agreed to in Nice in December 2000.  
 
2. Institutional and Conceptual Achievements 
The whole process from Cologne to Nice had the following outcome:  
 
Nomination of Javier Solana to the post of High Representative for CFSP 
To improve the effectiveness and the profile of the EU’s foreign policy a 
High Representative for the CFSP was appointed. The professor for solid-state 
physics, former Spanish Cabinet Minister (1982-1995) and Secretary-General of 
NATO (1995-1999) Javier Solana took office in October 1999. At the same time, 
Solana became Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union. In July 
2004 he was appointed for a second 5-year mandate.4 Solana has manifold 
tasks: 
• Supporting the Council by formulation, preparation and execution of 
political decisions 
• Development of concepts for a coherent and efficient security and 
defense policy 
• Exchange of information with the European Parliament 
• Supporting the Presidency in questions of the CFSP 
                                            
3 Jean-Yves Haine, “ESDP: an overview,” Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss-
eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
4 The Council of the European Union, “Curriculum vitae of Mr. Javier Solana,” 
http://ue.eu.int/cms3_applications/applications/solana/cv.asp?cmsid=246&lang=EN (accessed 
Apr. 21, 2005) 
7 
• Representing the EU in other international institutions such as 
NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) 
 
Creation of a Political and Security Committee (PSC) 
The Political and Security Committee consists of ambassadors from each 
member state who meet twice a week. Additionally, the Committee meets 
regularly with its NATO counterpart, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), to 
exchange information on defense and security issues.5  Its general function is to 
deal with all aspects of the CSFP and the European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP). This includes tracking the international situation as well as developing 
policies and monitoring their implementation. The PSC gives guidelines to the 
Military Committee and receives its opinions and recommendations. It evaluates 
military options, including the chain of command, operational concept, and 
operational plan and advises the Council of the European Union. Consequently, it 
plays an important role in decision-shaping, but not in decision-making. Although 
the PSC can exercise political control and strategic direction of a possible military 
operation, it will do so under the responsibility of the Council.6  
 
Creation of a European Military Committee (EUMC)  
While the PSC is the counterpart to NATO’s NAC, the European Military 
Committee is comparable to and on the same level as NATO’s Military 
Committee (MC). The EUMC represents the EU’s highest military body and 
though originally composed of the chiefs of staff of the member countries, is 
actually attended by their military representatives (MILREPs). The EUMC gives 
military advice and recommendations to the PSC and military directives to the 
European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The Military Committee’s work includes 
the development of an overall concept of crisis management in terms of military 
                                            
5 Rainer Feist (Admiral, ret., Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) from 
18 Sep 2002 - 30 Sep 2004), e-mail to the author, Nov. 7, 2004 
6 Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP: How It Works” in EU Security and Defense Policy, Institute for 
Security Studies, http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
8 
aspects, a risk assessment of potential crisis, and the elaboration, assessment, 
and review of the EU’s military capabilities.7 The EUMC meets regularly with 
NATO’s MC.8 
 
Creation of a European Military Staff (EUMS) 
 The European Military Staff provides the military experience and support 
to the ESDP. It represents a wide spectrum of expertise for the EU in terms of 
security and defense, and it functions as a link between political and military 
authorities within the Union. The Staff is integrated into the Secretary-General’s 
office and is immediately under the High Representative’s control. Its tasks 
encompass: 
• Early warning and situation assessment 
• Strategic planning within the scope of the Petersberg tasks 
• Developing methods and concepts based on or compatible with 
those of NATO 
• Observation and analysis of EU-led operations 
• Identification of national and multinational forces for EU-led 
operations 
• Recommendations to the EUMC 
• Implementation of policies and decisions as directed by the 
EUMC.9 
 
Incorporation of the Satellite Center (EUSC) 
 The Satellite Center, located in Torrejon, Spain, supports the EU and its 
member states by providing data gained by the analysis of earth observation 
satellite imagery. This way the EU decision makers have access to highly current  
                                            
7 Jean-Yves Haine, “ESDP: an overview,” Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss-
eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
8 Rainer Feist (Admiral, ret.), e-mail to the author, Nov. 7, 2004 
9 Jean-Yves Haine, “ESDP: an overview,” Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss-
eu.org/esdp/01-jyh.pdf (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
9 
information that may help them to carry out appropriate measures to keep risks 
under control before they might escalate. The EUSC concentrates its support on 
the following areas: 10 
• General security surveillance 
• Petersberg missions 
• Treaty verification 
• Arms and proliferation control 
• Maritime surveillance 
• Environmental monitoring 
 
Stating the Helsinki Headline Goal 
The Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) defined the military capabilities needed 
to conduct Petersberg missions where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The 
specific goal was to be able, by the end of 2003, to deploy 60,000 troops within 
60 days and to sustain them for at least one year. The idea was not to create 
standing EU forces. The goal was to establish a pool of national military 
capabilities on which the EU could draw in support of Petersberg missions.11 A 
key feature of the HHG was the voluntary character of the member states´ 
commitments and contributions.   
After Helsinki the ESDP was continuously further developed. In the 
European Council in Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000, the EU candidate 
countries and the non-EU NATO members were encouraged to contribute to 
strengthening the EU’s capability to take on military crisis management missions. 
Furthermore, the EU member states committed themselves to improving the EU’s 
capability for civil crisis management.  They decided on an action plan covering 
the areas of police cooperation, rule of law, civilian administration, and civil 
protection. By 2003, a pool of 5000 policemen, 200 judges, prosecutors, and 
other experts were to have been established. Out of the pool, assessment teams 
                                            
10 The European Union Satellite Center, “Mission of the European Union Satellite Center,” 
http://www.eusc.org/html/centre_mission.html (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
11 Burkard Schmitt, “European Capabilities: How Many Divisions?” in EU Security and 
Defense Policy,  http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
10 
and intervention teams could be dispatched for deployment on short notice. The 
teams would assist humanitarian actors through emergency operations.12 
In parallel, the relationship to NATO was clarified. Both parties agreed to 
close cooperation in questions of security and defense and that unnecessary 
duplication of effort had to be avoided. Instead of creating new structures, NATO 
and the EU tried to find solutions that allowed the EU access to NATO’s assets 
and planning and command capabilities. To ensure a complementary and 
mutually supportive development and improvement of military capabilities, both 
organizations agreed to establish appropriate consultation and information 
mechanisms.13 
To implement the HHG the member states created the so-called Headline 
Goal Task Force, consisting of national defense planning experts. This task force 
created a catalogue that transformed the objectives decided in Helsinki into 
concrete forces and specific capabilities. The experts concentrated on four 
scenarios and outlined 144 capabilities under seven categories.14 The outcome 
was finalised in the so-called Helsinki Headline Catalogue (HHC).  
At the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels in November 
2000 the member states specified the assets that they were able to contribute to 
fulfil the requirements of the HHG criteria. The result was recorded in the Helsinki 
Force Catalogue (HFC). At this time the EU had more than 100,000 persons, 400 
combat aircraft, and about 100 naval vessels at its disposal. The HHG was thus 
matched quantitatively, but the HFC expressed also that there was a strong need 
for qualitative improvements.  
In Nice in December 2000 the members agreed to establish a review 
mechanism that would include the evaluation and revision of the EU capability  
                                            
12 Burkard Schmitt, “European Capabilities: How Many Divisions?” in EU Security and 
Defense Policy,  http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
13 Ibid. 
14 1. Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence(C3I) 2. Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) 3. Deployability and Mobility 4. Effective 
Engagement 5. Protection and Survivability 6. Sustainability and Logistics 7. General Support 
11 
goals, the monitoring of the HFC, and the identification and harmonization of 
national contributions. The review mechanism led to a new HHC and the national 
contributions were refined.15 
 
3. Findings 
The agreements and outcomes of the Councils in Cologne, Helsinki, Feira, 
and Nice showed the will of the EU to develop autonomous capabilities and 
capacities to make decisions and to take on military operations in response to 
international crises.  The EU had taken its first steps toward becoming a serious 
player on the international political and military stage. With the incorporation of 
the EUSC, the definition of the HHG, and the development of subsequent 
concepts and mechanisms, the EU had entered a phase of capability building.16 
With the creation of the High Representative the EU finally fulfilled Henry 
Kissinger’s demand to “establish a phone number for Europe.” Javier Solana is 
an extraordinarily experienced and highly accepted politician. His experience as 
Secretary-General of NATO is not only very valuable for the position of the High 
Representative, but also for his work as the Secretary-General of the Council. His 
understanding and perceptions of NATO have been and will continue to be a 
great benefit for cooperation between the two organizations.  
The PSC, the EUMC, and the EUMS represent a framework of institutions 
that is strongly comparable to the proven institutional framework of NATO. These 
institutions constitute the cornerstone for a successful cooperation between 
NATO and the EU. Although the regular meetings between the PSC and the NAC 
on the one hand, and the EUMC and the NATO MC on the other hand, so far 
only serve the purpose of exchanging information, they demonstrate the firm 
willingness on both sides for coordination in the areas of security and defense 
issues.  The effectiveness of this cooperation on the institutional level could be 
improved   in   the   future   by   stepping  beyond  the  level  of  pure  information  
                                            
15 Burkard Schmitt, “European Capabilities: How Many Divisions?” in EU Security and 
Defense Policy,  http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
16 Martin Ortega, “Beyond Petersberg: Missions For the EU Military Forces” in EU Security 
and Defense Policy, http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
exchange. Both organizations often face the same problems. Consequently, the 
























                        
17 Rainer Feis
18 Sep 2002 - 30 
 North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) 12 
re 1.   NATO’s and the EU’s Po
ase, the structure of the EU secu
ary operations under political con
December 2000 the EU had g
efense Policy as part of its ov
. It had developed the willingnes
nctioning security and defense
awareness of the necessity 
is positive process would be con
                    
t (Admiral, ret., Deputy Supreme Allied
Sep 2004), e-mail to the author, Jan. 5,
 Political and Security 
Committee (PSC)   















Staff (IMS)  European Union 
ilitary Staff (EUMS)  cal-Military Framework 
y institutions forms a solid basis 
ol and with far-reaching military 
en birth to its own European 
arching Common Foreign and 
o take on military missions and 
stitutions. Furthermore, it had 
r improvement of its military 
ued and intensified after Nice. 
ommander Europe (DSACEUR) from 
05 
13 
B. THE CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT AFTER NICE 
1. The Military Capabilities 
a. The European Capabilities Action Plan 
  Although the Helsinki Headline Goal was already reached 
quantitatively at the end of 2000, a closer assessment of the Force and Headline 
Catalogues revealed substantial shortfalls in qualitative capabilities. The member 
states took this development into account and had their first Capability 
Improvement Conference in Brussels in November 2001. To address the 
capability shortfalls the ministers agreed on a European Capability Action Plan 
(ECAP) that is based on four principles.  
First, military cooperation among the member states or groups of 
members should be optimized by improving the effectiveness and efficiency of 
European military capability efforts. Second, the member states´ commitments 
would be on a voluntary basis. Third, the process would consider a close 
coordination and cooperation among not only the member states but also with 
NATO in order to address the specific shortfalls, to avoid unnecessary 
duplications, and to ensure transparency and consistency with NATO. Fourth, the 
ECAP would be transparent and visible so that it would get the support of the 
public of the member states.18  
  The analysis of the first phase of the ECAP process was summed 
up in a report that was presented to the member states on 1 March 2003. The 
report addressed various categories of shortfalls and developed options to rectify 
them. Some deficits could be reduced by simple revisions of national 
contributions others were more severe and needed the development of long-term 
solutions. The result of the report was a second phase of the ECAP process that 
was initiated at the second Capability Conference on 17 March 2003. This time 
the shortfalls were tackled by creating groups that would focus on the 
implementation of concrete projects. One lead nation was assigned to each 
group and was consequently responsible for the development of options and 
solutions in regard to a specific issue.  
                                            
18 Burkard Schmitt, “European Capabilities: How Many Divisions?” in EU Security and 
Defense Policy,  http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
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The second phase of the ECAP process is ongoing, and although 
appreciable achievements have been made, considerable shortfalls in numerous 
military key areas have been identified as well: 
 
Deployability 
The EU is not able to deploy more than 10-15% of its approximately 
1.8 million soldiers for missions abroad, primarily because the majority of the 
member-state forces are still structured to face Cold War challenges. 
 
Mobility 
The EU does not yet have the strategic transport capability that is 
needed to bring its personnel and material to distant locations. Efforts have been 
made to create a strategic sealift capability and some progress has occurred in 
this field, but the EU still lacks a strategic airlift component. The A 400 project is 
on its way, but for the foreseeable future the EU will depend on commercial 
options like leasing or chartering.  
 
Sustainability 
The lack of strategic transport capability also affects the 
sustainability of troops once they have been deployed. The farther away they are 
from Europe the bigger the challenge will be to support them logistically and 
medically. Furthermore, the small number of deployable soldiers will also limit 
their sustainability.  
 
Effective Engagement 
Because the forces of the member states have not yet completed a 
transformation from the Cold War to the challenges of the twenty-first century, 
they lack the capability for modern warfare. The EU is short of sophisticated 
precision-guided weapons, offensive electronic warfare, suppression of enemy 




C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) 
 
Although some capabilities exist in some member states, there 
generally is a major shortfall in this key area of modern warfare. There is no 
common standard technology among the EU members, resulting in a lack of 
interoperability that significantly decreases the effectiveness of the EU armed 
forces.19  
The assessment that resulted from the ECAP process 
demonstrated that the EU’s military capabilities and the Headline Goal that was 
set in Helsinki did not do justice to the new, more unconventional threats. The 
HHG was strongly influenced by the war in Kosovo; it needed to be adjusted 
according to the results of the ECAP process and to tackle the identified 
shortfalls. 
 
b. The Headline Goal 2010 
While the HHG was focused more on the quantitative dimension, 
the Headline Goal 2010 that was endorsed by the June 2004 European Council 
emphasizes qualitative aspects. By doing so, it reflects not only the results of the 
ECAP process, but also the evolution of the strategic environment and of 
technology.20 In addition to its focus on improving interoperability, deployability, 
mobility, and sustainability, the Headline Goal 2010 stresses the need for 
additional elements of pooling and possibilities for sharing. The Council of the 
European Union emphasizes that  
This approach requires Member States to voluntarily transform their 
forces by progressively developing a high degree of interoperability, 
both at technical, procedural and conceptual levels. Without 
prejudice to the prerogatives of Member States over defense 
matters, a coordinated and coherent development of equipment 
compatibility, procedures, concepts, command arrangements and 
defense planning is a primary objective. In this regard, commonality 
of security culture should also be promoted. Deployability, 
                                            
19 Burkard Schmitt, “European Capabilities: How Many Divisions?” in EU Security and 
Defense Policy,  http://www.iss-eu.org/books/5esdpen.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
20 The Council of the European Union, Document 6309/6/04, A 2, 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st06/st06309-re06.en04.pdf (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
16 
sustainability and other crucial requirements such as force 
availability, information superiority, engagement effectiveness and 
survivability will play an immediate pivotal role.21 
In general, the Headline Goal 2010 takes a broader approach to 
crisis management tasks.  While considering joint disarmament operations, the 
support for third countries in combating terrorism, and security sector reforms, it 
steps beyond the spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the 
Treaty on the European Union.22 As a result of the assessment, the member 
states identified a list of milestones that should be achieved within the 2010 
horizon:23 
• Establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS. This cell will 
have the capacity to set up an operation center for a particular 
operation 
• Establishment of a European Defense Agency that will act in the 
field of defense capability development, research, and acquisition 
• Implementation of EU Strategic lift joint coordination to achieve the 
necessary capacity and efficiency in strategic air, sea, and land lift 
• Development of a European Airlift Command 
• Development of rapidly deployable battle groups including the 
appropriate assets for strategic lift, sustainability, and debarkation 
• Availability of an aircraft carrier including an air wing and escorts 
• Improvement of performance at all levels of EU operations through 
appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications 
equipment and assets, terrestrial and space-based 
• Development of quantitative benchmarks and criteria that national 
forces declared to the Headline Goal have to meet in the field of 
deployability and multinational training 
 
                                            
21 The Council of the European Union, Document 6309/6/04, A 2, B 8 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st06/st06309-re06.en04.pdf (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
22 The Council of the European Union, Document 6309/6/04, A 2, 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st06/st06309-re06.en04.pdf (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
23 Ibid. A 5 
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2. The 2003 “Berlin-Plus” Arrangement  
The development of the European Security and Defense Policy has 
continuously considered close cooperation and coordination with NATO.  One 
major aim has always been to avoid unnecessary duplications and decoupling. 
Consequently, with the help of consultations and transparency, the EU and 
NATO have been successful in creating an established and deep-rooted strategic 
partnership. One major result of this partnership is the Berlin-Plus arrangement 
that was finally concluded by the EU and NATO’s Secretary General on 17 March 
2003. The term “Berlin-Plus” stands for a comprehensive package of agreements 
between NATO and the EU, based on the conclusions of the Washington Summit 
in April 1999. The package consists of three main elements that can be 
combined and that are directly connected to operations. It allows NATO to 
support EU-led crisis management operations in which the Alliance as a whole is 
not engaged militarily.24 
On the one hand, the EU has access to NATO planning. This may be a 
simple NATO contribution to the work carried out by the EUMS in the early 
stages before it is even clear if an operation will actually take place at all. Should 
there be an operation that is supported by NATO assets and capabilities, the 
required operational planning will be provided by NATO.  
On the other hand, the EU can request the use of NATO assets and 
capabilities. In case the EU in consultation with NATO decides to use NATO 
assets and capabilities in support to conduct a mission, NATO has established 
an initial list of assets and capabilities that would be available to the EU. The 
whole procedure includes financial and legal considerations and also possible 
scenarios that might make the recall of assets necessary, e.g., the emergence of 
a NATO Article 5 contingency. 
Finally, in case of an EU-led military operation NATO headquarters can be 
made available to the EU. The EU Operational Headquarters (EU OHQ) would 
be established at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and 
the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) becomes the EU 
                                            
24 NATO, “NATO-EU Cooperation Taken To A New Level,” 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/03-march/e0317a.htm (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
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Operation Commander (EU OPCDR). Subsequent elements in the chain of 
command could be provided either by NATO or by single EU member states. In 
any case, the EU will remain the responsible actor.25 
 
3. The 2003 European Security Strategy 
The evolution of the strategic environment and the new security 
challenges of the new century not only forced the EU to improve their military 
capabilities, but also pressured the member states to think about the 
development of strategic documents.  In May 2003 Javier Solana was tasked to 
produce a paper that would reflect the European mindset and perception of the 
current security challenges. His paper “A Secure Europe in a Better World” was 
accepted by the member states in June 2003 and finally endorsed by the 
European Council in December 2003 as the European Security Strategy (ESS). 
 The document identifies five key threats to Europe’s security: terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, state 
failure, and organized crime. Out of those threats three strategic objectives are 
derived:26 
 
1. Addressing the threats: the ESS stresses that it needs all areas of 
policy, including the deployment of military means, to accomplish this 
objective. It underlines that the first line of defense will often be abroad. 
 
2. Building security in the EU’s neighbourhood: this includes consolidation 
in the Balkans, strengthening cooperation with Mediterranean partners, 
extension of the benefits of economic and political cooperation to 
neighbors in the East, and, of particular strategic importance, solving 
the Arab/Israeli conflict. 
 
                                            
25 The Council of the European Union, “EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations 
and Berlin-Plus,” http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-
11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
26 The Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy,” 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
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3. An international order based on effective multilateralism: to accomplish 
this third objective, it is necessary to strengthen the multilateral 
structures (e.g., Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
OSCE), the transatlantic relationship, the cooperation with NATO, the 
relevance and possibilities of the UN, and the instruments for a 
preventive security policy. 
 
The ESS demands that the EU, based on the progress it has made, has to 
become more active, more capable, and more coherent. It underlines a need for 
the development of a strategic culture that also includes early, rapid, and, when 
necessary, robust intervention. With increasing capabilities the EU should think in 
terms of a wider spectrum of missions, widening the scope of the Petersberg 
declaration. Finally the strategy stresses international cooperation, particularly 
the need for a strong partnership with the United States.27  
In sum, by endorsing a strategy that considers military intervention in the 
sense of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the EU moves away from a rather careful 
and reserved understanding of the deployment of military means for crisis 
management.   
 
4. Findings 
After Nice the EU did not rest on its previous achievements. Although the 
first phase after St. Malo had already brought significant progress with the 
establishment of important institutions, a self-evident continuation of this positive 
development was not taken for granted. Continuous assessments disclosed 
weaknesses that were promptly tackled by countermeasures. The ECAP 
demonstrates the will of the EU to improve its military capabilities. Although some 
progress has been achieved, the existing shortfalls in the fields of deployability, 
mobility, sustainability, effective engagement, and C4ISR will limit the EU to low- 
and medium-intensity conflicts in the area of peacekeeping for years to come.  
                                            
27 The Council of the European Union, “European Security Strategy,” 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
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However, the publication of the ESS and the formulation of the Headline 
Goal 2010 demonstrate the awareness of the EU that it will have to continue to 
improve its capabilities and to widen its scope to be able to fulfill its responsibility 
as a world-class political and military player. The Headline Goal clearly tackles 
the shortfalls that were disclosed during the ECAP process. A functioning 
Defense Agency, an Airlift Command, strategic lift components, flexible and 
rapidly deployable battle groups, an aircraft carrier, and appropriate network 
linkages will increase the EU’s military capabilities enormously. If the EU is 
successful in achieving its goals, it will probably reach operational capability 
across the full range of the Petersberg tasks by 2010. The success of this 
undertaking strongly depends on the will of the member states to contribute 
voluntarily. Positive tendencies can already be identified: in November 2004 the 
EU defense ministers decided to create 13 battle groups by 2007. While France, 
Italy, Spain and Great Britain will form their own groups, the other nine will 
consist of multinational contributions.28 Furthermore, the European Defense 
Agency has already been established and started to work.29 
The EU’s progress was not limited to just internal achievements. While the 
establishment of the PSC, the EUMC, and the EUMS created the basis for 
cooperation and coordination with NATO, the Berlin-Plus arrangement was truly 
a milestone for the EU to become operational. While working on the improvement 
of its own capabilities, the EU had always tried to avoid duplications of and 
decoupling from NATO. Now, Berlin-Plus opens the possibility to use NATO’s 
integrated military command structure, its assets, and its planning. This 
achievement not only saves unnecessary financial efforts on the side of the EU, 
but also, and of particular importance, it intensifies the cooperation and the bonds 
between the two organizations. A challenge that might arise when Berlin-Plus is 
put into practice comes from the fact that the two organizations consist of 
different member states. The United States, Canada, Bulgaria, Romania, Iceland, 
                                            
28EU Observer, “EU Defense Ministers finalize Battle Groups,”  
http://www.euobserver.com/?aid=17822  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
29 The Council of the European Union, “Second Meeting of the European Defense Agency’s 
Steering Board,” http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/82764.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
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Norway, and Turkey are members of NATO, but not of the EU. On the other 
hand, Sweden, Finland, Austria, and Ireland are members of the EU, but not of 
NATO. For future EU-led operations it will be very important to ensure the full 
transparency for all those countries. Without denying existing deficits and 
weaknesses, the development and improvement of the ESDP and the results that 
have been achieved in a comparatively short period of time prove the strong will 
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III. THE OPERATION “CONCORDIA” IN MACEDONIA 
A. BACKGROUND  
The instability in Macedonia in 2001 arose from ethnic conflicts between 
the generally Slavonic Macedonian population and Albanian minorities. Those 
conflicts escalated in open fights between Macedonian government troops and 
ethnic Albanian extremists, most of them organized in the National Liberation 
Army (NLA).  Just after those fights had come to an end in June 2001, the 
President of Macedonia requested NATO assistance for his government in 
demilitarizing the NLA and all other Albanian extremists.30 After both conflict 
parties had agreed on a framework agreement for peace and stability, signed in 
the city of Ohrid on 13 August 2001,31 NATO launched its operation “Essential 
Harvest” on 22 August 2001.  The 30-day operation was conducted by a task 
force consisting of approximately 3,500 soldiers, equipped with the appropriate 
command and control structure, support troops, helicopter lift, and force 
protection capability.  The goal was to collect and destroy weapons and 
ammunition from the Albanian extremists.32  
“Essential Harvest” was replaced by operation “Amber Fox” on 27 
September 2001. Again, a task force was created, this time consisting of 
approximately 1,000 troops, mandated to protect the international monitors from 
the EU and the OSCE and to guarantee the implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement. Initially the mission was limited for three months. 
However it was finally extended until 15 December 2002.33 
After the peaceful elections in autumn 2002 the president of Macedonia 
asked NATO for further presence and support in his country. Consequently, 
                                            
30 NATO, “Skopje requests NATO assistance,” 
http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0618/e0620a.htm  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
31 Council of Europe, “The Ohrid Agreement,” http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-
operation/Police_and_internal_security/Police_cooperation/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2
001.asp  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
32 NATO, “Operation Essential Harvest,“ http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tfh/home.htm (accessed 
Apr. 21, 2005) 
33 NATO, “Operation Amber Fox,“ http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tff/home.htm (accessed Apr. 21, 
2005) 
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NATO agreed on a successor mission for “Amber Fox”.  The operation “Allied 
Harmony”, consisting of approximately 450 troops, started on 16 December 2002 
and like “Amber Fox”, its task was to ensure support for the implementation of the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement, with the help of liaison and monitoring operations, 
and to assist the Macedonian government in taking responsibility for the country’s 
security by providing comprehensive military advice.34 
The EU had already signaled in June 2002 that it would be willing to take 
over responsibility for a military mission in Macedonia. However, the NATO 
member states Greece and Turkey had severe concerns about how NATO 
assets could be used by the EU. It finally needed the Berlin-Plus arrangement to 
clear the way for the EU to take over its very first military mission on 31 March 
2003, operation “Concordia”, which lasted until 15 December 2003.35 
 
B. OBJECTIVES  
 The different reactions of European countries to the U.S. plans for a war 
against Iraq revealed the significant differences in mindsets and perceptions 
among the member states. While Great Britain, Spain, and Italy generally 
supported a strike against Iraq, the other two big players inside the EU, Germany 
and France, were strongly opposed to a military intervention.  This not only 
created a rift between some strong European countries and the United States 
that endangered the coherence of NATO, but also the obvious lack of common 
thinking by the EU member states about this critical topic put the whole ESDP in 
question. The progress made since St. Malo had been very dynamical and 
successful, but the different attitudes toward the war against Iraq gave birth to                         
serious doubts whether the EU will be able to actually act unitarily in the field of 
security and defense policy.36 Consequently, one of the political objectives of 
Concordia was not only to test the created structures and instruments 
                                            
34 NATO Allied Joint Force Command Naples, “Allied Harmony,” 
http://www.afsouth.nato.int/nhqs/missions/alliedHarmony/alliedHarmony%20Mission.htm   
(accessed Apr. 21, 2005)   
35 Jean-Yves Haine, “Berlin-Plus,” Institute for Security Studies, http://www.iss-
eu.org/esdp/03-jyhb%2B.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005)   
36 Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro, Allies at War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 2 
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successfully, particularly the Berlin-Plus arrangement, but also to demonstrate 
that the member states were actually able to act together in a crisis on European 
ground and that the freshly developed ESDP was not just a paper tiger but a 
credible policy. The operation would make clear that the EU is willing to take on 
political responsibility.37 
 Concordia’s main military-strategic objective was to contribute to the 
stabilization of the situation in Macedonia in order to guarantee the continuous 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The EU forces were tasked 
to ensure the establishment of a secure and stable environment by a small-scale 
military presence and by supporting the Macedonian government.  
 As derived from these strategic objectives, the EU’s primary military 
objectives were the provision of a visible military presence, particularly in areas of 
potential instability and ethnic tension, and the maintenance situation awareness 
for its own forces. Additionally, close contact and cooperation with local 
authorities and inhabitants and other international organizations had to be 
established and maintained, particularly in affairs concerning significant activities 
in potentially unstable areas. Finally, the international-community monitors were 
to be supported and protected in order to ensure the implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement.38 
 While the EU would take over the operational responsibility from NATO, 
the latter organization would maintained its headquarters in Macedonia and 
establish a NATO Advisory Team that was tasked to advise the Macedonian 
government on the reform of their military forces and on all matters with regard to 
the program Partnership for Peace (PfP). Furthermore, the NATO headquarters 
in Skopje had to fulfill logistic tasks for the support of the Kosovo Force (KFOR).  
 
                                            
37 Rebecca Jovin, “Die Bedeutung der EU Mission Concordia fuer die ESDP,“ Deutsche 
Gesellschaft fuer auswärtige  Politik e.V.,  
http://www.weltpolitik.net/Sachgebiete/Internationale%20Sicherheitspolitik/GASP/Grundlagen/Die
%20Bedeutung%20der%20EU%20Mission%20%22Concordia%22%20in%20Mazedonien%20f%
FCr%20die%20ESVP.html  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005)   
38 Delegation of the European Commission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
“EUFOR Mission, ” http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/mission.htm (accessed Apr. 21, 
2005)   
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C. RISK ASSESSMENT  
 One requirement of the Ohrid Framework Agreement was that a census 
be conducted in Macedonia under international supervision in 2002. The census 
shows a 64.18% majority of Macedonians and 25.17% Albanians. The rest of the 
population consists mainly of Turks, Roma and Serbs.39   
 Although there was little genuine inter ethnic hatred between the ethnic 
Albanians and the ethnic Macedonians, a huge social gap between the 
respective communities was obvious, especially in educational issues. In some 
areas the minority groups were pressured by the majority residents in an attempt 
to force them out or to prevent members of a minority group to return. But those 
incidences were so rare that they could not realistically be called ethnic 
cleansing. However, the rather complicated and sensitive political circumstances 
between the two major ethnic groups had caused the implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement to fall behind the planned schedule. The existing mistrust 
between the ethnic Albanians and the ethnic Macedonians was still too strong to 
more quickly implement the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Though this 
development was criticized by international, and, more particularly, domestic 
groups, an unnecessary and premature acceleration of the process could have 
significantly damaged previous achievements.  
A Macedonian police force was successfully established but, particularly in 
the former crisis area, the domestic police were often threatened by organized 
crime when they started investigations to stem illegal activities. The local police 
had not achieved the capability to fight against criminal organizations. That 
negative situation was complicated further by the population’s lack of confidence 
in their police force, especially when the officers did not belong to their own 
ethnic group.40  
Corruption, even among politicians, was widespread. Particularly on the 
ethnic Albanian side there were many officials who were very closely linked to 
criminal organizations. However, because of the overriding influence of the 
                                            
39 US Department of State, “Background Note: Macedonia,“ 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26759.htm  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005)   
40 Document consulted by the author. 
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Albanian clan system and the lack of state authority, the ordinary population was 
frightened to report irregularities. Thus criminal groups exploited the state’s 
weakness and benefited largely from the situation. Although organized crime was 
the main threat to Macedonia’s security, a military response could have had a 
negative effect and might have led to an unnecessary escalation of the still fragile 
domestic situation.41 
 
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE  
1. NATO’s Command and Control Structure 
The Berlin-Plus arrangement opened the way for the EU to get access to 
NATO’s approved command and control structures. NATO has two main military 
commands. The first is the Allied Command Transformation (ACT), located in 
Norfolk, Virginia. The second is the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium. SHAPE is the headquarters of the Allied Command 
Operations (ACO), which is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR), a U.S. flag or general officer. Until the end of September 
2004, the position of the DSACEUR was taken rotationally by a German or British 
flag or general officer. However, because Germany abstained from the position 
from 1 October 2004 on, German Admiral Rainer Feist turned over the command 
to British General Sir John Reith on 30 September 2004. In exchange, Germany 
got the position of Chief of Staff (COS).42 
The ACO has three standing subordinate commands: the Allied Joint 
Force Command (JFC) Naples, in Italy, the Allied JFC Brunssum, in Holland, and 
a smaller Joint Headquarters (JHQ) in Lisbon, Portugal. Each JFC is supported 
by three standing component commands, specializing in land, air, and maritime 
operations.   In addition, each JFC commands temporary headquarters in case of  
                                            
41 Document consulted by the author. 
42 NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, http://www.nato.int/shape/  
(accessed Apr. 21, 2005)  
NATO operations in its area of responsibility. Consequently, the JFC Naples has 
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2. CONCORDIA’s Command and Control Structure 
There was a broad consensus among the EU and NATO members to use 
NATO’s command and control structure for Concordia. Consequently, SHAPE 
became the Strategic Command and EU Operation Headquarters (EU OHQ). 
The DSACEUR at this time, German Admiral Rainer Feist, was designated EU 
Operation Commander (EU OPCDR) in February 2003. He formed his OHQ to 
support him and, at the strategic level, to provide command, control, planning 
and coordination of the operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.  
The SHAPE Operations Division took over the lead and the Assistant Director of 
Operations was appointed EU Director of Operations. Due to the short timeframe 
available, the transfer of authority was supposed to take place at the end of 
March 2003, but the EU decided to shortcut the Operational Planning Process 
(OPP) by omitting the development of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS). 
Moreover, other concepts like the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) had to 
stay generic and did not cover all the necessary details important in a planning 
process.44 Additionally, there was no EU Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA’s), 
but with the approval of all actors, the EU could use the existing NATO SOFA for 
Concordia.45 
There was also a need to integrate the EU member states that were not 
NATO members into SHAPE to ensure full transparency. Three weeks before the 
start of the operation, this was achieved by integrating an EU Staff Group 
(EUSG) under the command of a Swedish naval captain into the Strategic 
Direction Center, the strategic core element of the headquarters. The EUSG 
consisted of officers representing eight countries, including three EU non-NATO 
countries. Some of the EUSG staff officers were “double-hatted”, that is, they had 
to fulfill their tasks as SHAPE staff members as well.46  
Because of strict NATO security regulations, the EU non-NATO officers 
were initially not allowed to enter classified areas at SHAPE, so smooth operation 
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was initially hampered. The handling and exchange of information was finally 
worked out due to practicable regulations and the goodwill and open-mindedness 
of key actors.47  
To maintain a NATO liaison at the EU, a SHAPE staff officer was 
designated as the DSACEUR liaison and sent to the EUMS. This happened on 
both an ad-hoc basis and on demand of the DSACEUR. The officer was linked to 
NATO’s secure data-link system, so he had access to restricted material. 
However, his attendance at EU meetings was limited to those with Concordia 
related agendas.48 
It was a greater challenge to find a consensus with regard to the 
subsequent command level. The commander of the JFC Naples is always a U.S. 
admiral. When the EU and NATO had to decide about Concordia’s command and 
control structure, the deputy commander of the JFC Naples was staffed by 
Turkey, a NATO, but not an EU member. Furthermore, the JFC Naples had to 
stay in the chain of command because this headquarters was responsible for all 
NATO missions in the Balkans. The out-rooting of the JFC made NATO’s support 
for the EU-led operation in Macedonia more than difficult; it was nearly 
impossible for the EU to get access to NATO’s operational reserves in the 
Balkans. While the strategic reserves are demanded, directed, and controlled by 
the SACEUR and DSACEUR, responsibility for the operational reserves lies with 
the commander of the JFC Naples.49 
The solution to this challenge was the establishment of an EU cell under 
the command of a European officer, as had been done in SHAPE. Consequently, 
one week before the start of the operation, a European Command Element 
(EUCE) was integrated into the JFC Regional Operation Center (ROC) and the 
Italian JFC COS became also the Head of EUCE. The EUCE staff was 
embedded into the ROC as an autonomous group under the direction of the ROC 
director.50  
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In Macedonia, a EU forces headquarters (EUFOR HQ) was established in 
the close vicinity of NATO’s headquarters in Skopje. A collocation of the two HQs 
was not possible due to infrastructural reasons; however, they were in fact 
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HQs, in Tetovo, Kumanovo, and Skopje, covering the Former Crisis Area (FCA) 
that had been divided into three sectors.52 
The OPCDR on the strategic level received a Weekly Situation Report and 
a Monthly Assessment Report from the FCDR through the COS EUCE. The 
necessary Command and Information System (CIS) support was provided by 
NATO. This way it ensured that all command levels were kept on an appropriate 
level of information. NATO also managed the EU’s Mission Secret Wide Area 
Network and telephony in Macedonia. The communication and information flow 
on the EUFOR HQ level was ensured by France as the framework and lead 
nation. A French command support brigade formed the CIS element in the 
EUFOR HQ.53 
 
E. FORCE COMPOSITION  
In keeping with the Berlin-Plus agreement, NATO made available a NATO 
European command option and allowed the EU access to NATO’s planning 
facilities. Moreover, the agreement allowed the EU to use NATO assets and 
capabilities. To generate the appropriate and desired forces for Concordia the EU 
took advantage of NATO’s proven force-generation process. The SDC at SHAPE 
provided the mechanisms and staff to fulfill the requests defined in the EU´s 
statement of requirements. Most of the countries that had been taking part in 
NATO’s mission “Allied Harmony” stayed in Macedonia to support Concordia as 
well.54 
The European forces consisted of approximately 400 soldiers from 26 
different countries: thirteen EU members, six NATO non-EU nations, and seven 
non-EU non-NATO nations. Those personnel framed the following units next to 
the EUFOR HQ and the three RHQ:55 
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• 22 Light Field Liaison Teams, provided by FRA, SPA, GER, AUT, 
POR, GRE, NOR, SWE, FIN, POL, and TUR 
• 9 Heavy Field Liaison Teams, provided by FRA and ITA 
• 1 Light Helicopter Detachment, provided by BEL 
• 2 Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams, provided by ITA and AUT 
• 1 field ambulance, provided by GRE and BEL 
• 1 helicopter platoon on 12-hours notice, provided by GRE 
 
Logistic support for the units was provided by their national support 
elements. To achieve the given mission objectives, the liaison teams were tasked 
to conduct presence and information-gathering patrols; area and route 
reconnaissance by helicopter, vehicles, or on foot; and surveillance of events and 
incidents, particularly in support of OSCE and the European Union Monitoring 
Mission (EUMM). The teams were accommodated in rented houses in residential 
areas of zones where disputes between the ethnic Albanians and Macedonians 
had been strongest. That ensured that the teams were living and moving among 
the local population. Access to all the houses was open, not secured by special 
measures like guards or fences. The close relation to the local population was 
deepened by several smaller civil military cooperation projects in villages in the 
FCA. 56  
   
F. END OF MISSION  
Concordia, the first ever EU military operation, ended 15 December 2003. 
A military presence in Macedonia was no longer necessary. Concordia was 
replaced by the EU police mission “Proxima” to deal with the evolving security 
situation in Macedonia.57 During Concordia, the Berlin-Plus arrangement 
between the EU and NATO was put into practise for the very first time as well. 
Moreover, inside the country the EU stepped away from a strict military structure 
based on a regiment, battalion, company, and platoon. Instead, the 
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establishment of liaison teams tasked to keep close contact and to create good 
relations with the local population, represented a rather unconventional 
approach. Although the “EU force has contributed decisively to an enhanced 
return of stability in Macedonia,”58 many findings and lessons learned can be 
identified that must be taken into consideration by the EU when planning and 
executing future military operations. 
 
G. FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 Certainly, Concordia was a small military operation and EU forces did not 
face a real military threat inside Macedonia. The main task was not to separate 
two combatants. Rather, the main challenge was to decrease the rift between two 
major ethnic groups inside the country so that the implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement could proceed peacefully and successfully. In addition, it 
was not the goal of the EU military forces to fight against organized crime inside 
the country. The military is neither trained for that, nor does it have the proper 
equipment. In fact, the use of military action against certain politicians and other 
persons known to be involved in criminal organizations could have had a 
counterproductive effect in stabilizing the internal situation.59 The successor 
mission to Concordia, the police operation Proxima, concentrates exactly on that 
issue. Proxima's police experts were tasked to monitor, mentor, and advise the 
country's police, thus helping to fight organized crime as well as promoting 
European policing standards.60 
 The military structure of the EU forces inside Macedonia turned out to be 
one key for the success of the EU's contribution to the return of stability in 
Macedonia. The creation of liaison teams and their accommodation in rented 
houses among the local population not only led to good relations with the 
population but also a quick and confidence-building effect. Wherever the teams 
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showed up, they were welcomed by one of the ethnic groups. Indeed, the 
continuous presence of the liaison teams among the local population was the 
most effective way to reduce the tensions among the ethnic Albanians and the 
Macedonians.61 
 The lead-nation principle, when establishing the EUFOR HQ in Skopje, 
has also proven very effective. The role of France as the framework nation was 
one of the key factors, particularly during the initial phase of the mission. A 
French command support brigade’s provision of the Communications and 
Information System (CIS) greatly facilitated the deployment of the HQ. However, 
besides the French CIS to ensure communication on the HQ level, the EU 
depended on NATO capabilities. Without NATO’s CIS support the chain of 
command from the EUFOR HQ through the EUCE to the EU OHQ could neither 
have been maintained nor could the command levels have been provided with 
information in the necessary time and manner.62 
At the beginning of the operation, both the separation of the EU and the 
NATO headquarter in Skopje and a lack of existing regulations made the 
exchange of information and intelligence unnecessarily difficult. It finally worked, 
but this was largely due to an agreement signed at the HQ level and that 
depended on the goodwill of key actors. Moreover, there was no direct link 
between EUFOR and NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). Any coordination between 
the two forces had to be conducted through the NATO HQ in Skopje. Future 
operations will need clear regulations on how information and intelligence-sharing 
is to be conducted. The first step and an appropriate basic element could be the 
establishment of a common Intelligence Cell.63 
The integration of the EUCE into the JFC Naples was also a success. It 
was essential for the maintenance of the chain of command because it ensured 
the continuous flow of information from the EU OPCDR at SHAPE to the EU 
FCDR in Skopje. Additionally, it provided connectivity at the regional level to the 
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Balkan joint area of operations and ensured transparency for participating non-
NATO EU nations. However, the establishment of the EUCE should be done in a 
timely manner so that an appropriate training phase based on clear job 
descriptions can be conducted.64 
The establishment of the EU OHQ at SHAPE under the command of the 
DSACEUR was essential for the success of the operation because it gave the EU 
access to NATO capabilities and capacities to plan, direct, conduct, and sustain 
Concordia at the military strategic level.65 As with the EUCE at the JFC level, the 
integration of the EUSG into SHAPE also ensured transparency between NATO 
and the EU. This transparency factor is of particular importance and needs to be 
taken into consideration in future EU-led operations using NATO assets and 
capabilities. However, due to a lack of security agreements between the two 
organizations, the EU staff officers of the EUSG were initially not granted access 
to NATO information related to the operation. Thus, future operations, both 
organizations must overcome their exaggerated bureaucracy and find pragmatic 
rules and regulations for operational cooperation. EU officers in the EU OHQ 
need full access to all information related to a EU-led operation right from the 
beginning of the planning phase.66 Moreover, the number of “double-hatted” 
officers in the EUSG resulted in a substantially increased workload and 
sometimes a clash of interests in some branches of SHAPE. Consequently, this 
concept should be reviewed and rechecked before it is used for future 
operations.67 
 The ad hoc establishment of the DSACEUR liaison at the EUMS was 
highly relevant for the DSACEUR. This officer ensured the close connection of 
the OPCDR to the important players in the EU. He had direct contact with the 
Director General of the EUMS and was the connecting element between the 
EUMC and the PSC. Consequently, the DSACEUR liaison could act as an “early 
warning unit” for Admiral Feist, giving him inputs as soon as the participating EU 
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nations signaled problems or questions concerning the operational planning or 
later on, the rundown of the mission.68    
The EU’s decision to deviate from NATO’s operational planning process, 
due to the lack of time, had a contrary effect and was not time-saving. The 
absence of required details in the planning process led to the delayed approval of 
other concepts and complicated the overall decision-making process. 
Furthermore, the EU’s lack of its own SOFA’s and an overall legal framework 
resulted in increased costs, delayed response times, and personnel legal risks. 
For future EU-led operations, the EU will need its own legal support and legal 
arrangements, not only with the country where the operation takes place but also 
with any third-party nations.69  
Overall, the objectives of Concordia were doubtlessly achieved, although 
there are certain areas that have to be ameliorated. The Berlin-Plus agreement 
between the EU and NATO proved to be an outstanding and extremely effective 
tool for future EU-led military operations. The EU was able to use structures, 
assets, and capabilities that were initially created for NATO. SHAPE in Mons and 
the JFC in Naples proved that they can act as military headquarters for both 
organisations, and the EU demonstrated that it is willing to take responsibility for 
crisis management and is able to conduct successful military operations.70 With 
the help of a visible military presence, maintenance of situation awareness and 
close and intense contact and cooperation with the local population and 
authorities, Concordia contributed to the smooth implementation of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement. The significance for the EU of the successful operation 
Concordia was summed up by the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana 
on 16 December 2003, just one day after the operation in Macedonia ended:   
For the European Union it is a good day, because what started as 
the first ever EU-led military operation is successfully concluded. As 
part of a comprehensive international peace implementation effort 
led by the EU and the United States, Operation Concordia has, as 
did previous NATO-led missions, provided a stabilizing presence in 
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areas of tension. While the mission was small, the Union has 
showed that it is able to deploy a capable military force. It has also 
proven that, like few other international actors, it can bring together 
different instruments and capabilities: political leadership, military 
force, and economic support.  Finally, for the EU, this day is a sign 
that a lot has been achieved over a short period of time. We began 
to build a Common European Foreign and Security Policy in 1992. 
Few then believed that only a decade later we would send out men 
in arms under the EU's flag. However, much more remains do be 
done if the EU is to be ready to meet old and new challenges in a 
more complex world. A successful military operation constitutes a 
significant step in this direction: towards a Europe that is able to 
share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better 
world.71 
Although Concordia was a comparatively small mission, its positive 
outcome certainly strengthened the EU’s self-confidence and will to take on more 
challenging military operations in the future. In fact, the success in Macedonia 
paved the way for the EU to replace NATO as the responsible organization to 
implement the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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IV. THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. From the Ottomans to Tito 
The Balkan region is often referred to by Western countries as the back 
door to Europe or the Balkan powder keg. Indeed, for many people the region 
carries too much cultural baggage to actually belong to Europe. Today, many 
Western societies associate war, intrigue, and human suffering with the term “the 
Balkans”.72 Due to the geographical position of the region, the Balkans has 
always been crossed by armies on their way to Asia, Europe, Russia, or Africa. 
Many of those armies left the region devastated and plundered. This legacy of 
war, the memory of defeats and massacres, has strongly influenced the cultural 
heritage and the identity of each Balkan nation or ethnic group.73  
Although the whole European continent had suffered from devastating 
wars during the previous centuries, the Balkan wars stand out because they all 
have been fought for the same reasons: nationalism, religion, and ethnic hatred. 
Still, after the outbreak of the war in the 1990s, Western policy makers refused to 
understand why the small countries in this southeastern region of Europe were 
so willing to fight the same battles on their own soil over and over again. The 
forces of nationalism and religion were simply underestimated by the West. Even 
fifty years of Communist rule could neither snuff out the national consciousness 
nor the religious fervor inside the different ethnic groups.74  
While central and western Europe could start their political, cultural, and 
economical development in the fifteenth century, that process was strongly 
hampered for the countries in the Balkans due to the Ottoman occupation. The 
evolution of the Balkan societies was suppressed for nearly five hundred years 
by the Turkish conquest. Important eras, like the Renaissance, the Age of 
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Enlightenment, and later on the Industrial Revolution, had little impact on the 
Balkan region. Consequently, the states in the Balkans not only have lagged 
behind the West technologically but also have emerged comparatively late as 
modern societies.75 
 When the Turks occupied the Balkans, Bosnia was rapidly absorbed into 
the Ottoman Empire. While most Balkan countries around Bosnia retained their 
own religions – the Serbs stuck to Eastern Orthodox Christianity and the 
Croatians remained Roman Catholic – a majority of the native Bosnian 
population gradually converted to Islam.76   
When the Ottoman era in the Balkans came to an end by the end of the 
nineteenth century, the Congress of Berlin in June/July 1878 restructured the 
Balkans.  However, the interests and the overlapping and contradictory national 
territories of the emerging Balkan states were secondary. The Great Powers 
shuffled land and people in the region without considering the possible 
consequences. Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed over to Austria-Hungary 
and Serbia became sovereign. Macedonia, a mosaic of many different ethnic 
groups and additionally a strategic hub for many countries in the region, was 
given back to the Ottoman Empire. The Congress reconfigured the Balkans in a 
way that ensured other conflicts in the region and also among the Great 
Powers.77 
 The rule of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was never really accepted by 
the Bosnian population. Particularly for the Serbs in Bosnia the Austro-
Hungarians were nothing but a replacement of the Turks who had occupied their 
home soil for almost five hundred years. When Archduke Ferdinand visited 
Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, he was not considering that the day was the National 
Day of the Serbs. On June 28, 1389, Prince Lazar had led the Serb armies 
against the forces of Ottoman Sultan Murad I on the field of Kosovo Polje. The 
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Battle of Kosovo became the symbol of Serbian nationalism. Ferdinand would be 
punished fatally for his ignorance of Balkan history. His and his wife’s 
assassination by the Serb Gavrilo Princip in the Bosnian city of Sarajevo 
triggered World War I.78 
After the end of World War I Bosnia joined the newly created Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Although its outline was preserved on the map, 
Bosnia did not retain a formal status. In 1929, the Serb King Alexander I declared 
a royal dictatorship and changed the name of the state to Yugoslavia. The 
historical regions were replaced by nine prefectures, all drafted deliberately to cut 
across the lines of traditional regions. Bosnia was wiped off the map. The first 
Yugoslavia was brought to an end by World War II and the Axis powers' invasion 
in April 1941. Bosnian territory was absorbed into the Nazi puppet state, 
“Independent State of Croatia”. A fascist movement, the Ustasa, was put into 
power and began a ruthless and violent persecution of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies, 
and antifascist Croats. Two organized resistance movements emerged inside 
Croatia, a Serb royalist force known as the Chetniks, and the communist Partisan 
force that included Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, led by Josip Broz Tito. Tito and 
his Partisans liberated Sarajevo in April 1945 and a “people’s government” for 
Bosnian was declared. The Soviet army, supported by Tito’s Partisans, had 
already liberated Serbia in October 1944. Until May 1945 Communist control of 
the whole of Yugoslavia was further strengthened so that the Federal People’s 
Republic of Yugoslavia could be proclaimed in November 1945. Meanwhile, Tito 
was successfully consolidating his power in the newly created Republic. In 
subsequent years, however, Tito more and more followed a policy of 
nonalignment and, finally, Yugoslavia was cut off from the Soviet Union and its 
eastern European satellites.79  
When Tito died in May 1980, Yugoslavia consisted of six republics – 
Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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(BiH)80 – and two autonomous regions, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Each of the 
republics and regions had its own parliament, government, and bureaucracy and 
in each republic you could find several different ethnic groups.  
 
2. From Tito’s Death to Dayton 
Although Tito had created the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, he 
was always aware that the different ethnic groups could not really be integrated 
within a supranation.81 He was right. After his death a nationalist movement 
quickly arose in Serbia, claiming Serbian dominance in Yugoslavia based on the 
majority of Serbs among the Yugoslavian population. Particularly in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and in Croatia the proportion of Serbs was high. The myth of the 
Battle of Kosovo, the myth of the fight of the Serbs against the Islamic threat, was 
used by the radical Serbian nationalistic movement and their leader Slobodan 
Milosevic to mobilize the Serbian population.82 By June 1989, the 600-year 
anniversary of the battle on the field of Kosovo Polje, the Albanian population in 
Kosovo had lost their rights and their autonomy.83 Meanwhile, also in BiH and 
Croatia, Serbian nationalistic movements had arisen that adopted Beograd’s idea 
of a Great Serbian state. As early as 1990 the Serbs proclaimed “liberated areas” 
inside Croatia. While Milosevic was successful in keeping the socialist system in 
Serbia alive, new democratic movements in Croatia and Slovenia tried to reform 
the communistic structures. In spring 1991 the Croatian and Slovenian 
populations voted for independence from Yugoslavia. Consequently, both 
countries declared their independence on 25 June 1991. This development 
increased the aggressions on the Serbian side even further and disembogued 
into war between Croatia and Serbia. Serbian troops, supported by the 
Yugoslavian Peoples Army, conquered about one-third of Croatian territory. The 
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UN reacted by declaring a weapons embargo on the whole of Yugoslavia, while 
the European Community put economic sanctions on all Yugoslavian republics. 
In December 1991, Croatia and Serbia agreed on an armistice, and in spring 
1992, in keeping with the Vance-Plan, the UN deployed troops, the United 
Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).84 Its initial function was “to create the 
conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall 
settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.”85 
But the overarching Croatian-Serbian fight was not just about Serbian- 
claimed territory inside Croatia. As early as March 1991, Croatian President 
Franjo Tudjman and the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic met and principally 
agreed on the territorial division of BiH.86 In spring 1992, Beograd and Zagreb 
stressed that after the breakdown of Yugoslavia as a whole, the multiethnic and 
multicultural Bosnia society no longer had the right to exist.87 
At that time the people inside BiH did not want war. Until fall 1991 the 
main national parties of the three ethnic groups – the Serbian Democratic Party 
(SDS), the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Croatian 
Democratic Community (HDZ) – still had moderate and democratic political 
goals. The situation began to change in fall 1991 with the radicalization of the 
SDS under their new leader, Radovan Karadzic. In January 1992, the SDS 
openly stood up for a territorial division of BiH and declared their own republic, 
the “Republika Srpska”. In early 1992, the Croatian HDZ also adopted more 
radical tendencies. Its leader, the nationalist Mate Boban, tried to get all 
Croatian-dominated regions inside Bosnia and Herzegovina under his control. 
Like the Serbs, the Croatians intended to create their own entity, the “Herzeg-
Bosna”.  The third ethnic group, the Bosnians – represented by the SDA and their 
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Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovic – denied the division of the Bosnian-
Herzegovinian territory. A referendum held in March 1992 resulted in a majority 
for independence from Yugoslavia. Shortly after the referendum, in April 1992, 
the United States and the EC recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina diplomatically. 
This development sparked the war. By November 1992 the Army of the 
Republika Srpska, supported by the Yugoslavian Army, had gained two-thirds of 
the country. Most important, by conquering the Posavina region, including the city 
of Brcko, and the ethnic cleansing of the area around Banja Luka and Prijedor, 
the Serbs succeeded in connecting the Serb-controlled areas in Croatia with 
those in BiH. When the Serbian offensive ended in November 1992, 
approximately 50,000 to 100,000 people had been killed and several hundred 
thousand had lost their homes.88 
 
Figure 4.   Front structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 199389 
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The UN replied to the Serbian aggression with an economic embargo in 
May 1992 against Serbia and Montenegro. Furthermore, the UNPROFOR 
mission was extended to BiH. The forces were initially tasked to support the 
humanitarian convoys that had been set up by many international organizations. 
Later on, UNPROFOR would additionally monitor the established “no-fly” zone 
and United Nations "safe areas" established by the Security Council around the 
Bosnian cities Srebrenica, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and Sarajevo.90 
However, UNPROFOR was not mandated to enforce peace. Force could only be 
used in self-defense. Thus, the “peace keeping” task of the forces would lead to a 
massive contradiction in an environment that needed a robust “peace-enforcing” 
mandate.91  
Cooperation between the Croatians and the Bosnians came to an end 
after the Serbs finished their offensive in November 1992. The Serbs had 
achieved their basic goal and had conquered nearly all of the desired territory. 
The Serbian aggression united the Croatians and the Bosnians only temporarily. 
After the fight against the Serbs significantly lessened, the Croatian nationalists 
attempted to achieve their own political goals. Like the Serbian nationalists, 
Croatians strove for a territorial division of BiH. Now it was their turn to have a 
piece of the “Bosnian-Herzegovinian cake”. In April 1993 Croatian troops 
attacked several Bosnian cities and drove away the Bosnian population. At that 
time also the Bosnian leaders adopted a more radical stance. As a countermove 
to the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim Bosnian population by the Croatian troops, 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian forces, the “Armija BiH”, started to dispel the Catholic 
Croatian population from central Bosnia. The international community reacted to 
this development with proposals of peace plans – the Vance/Owen-Plan in 
January 1993 and the Owen/Stoltenberg-Plan in September 1993 – that 
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suggested a peaceful partitioning of the country without destroying its overall 
integrity. Neither plan was accepted by all involved entities.92 
By the end of 1993 all Bosnian-controlled territories were fully cut off. Their 
survival depended solely on support from international humanitarian 
organizations whose convoys were protected by UN forces, at this time still 
UNPROFOR. As a result of the failure of the suggested plans and the 
challenging situation in BiH, the German and the U.S. governments increased 
their pressure on the Croatian government in Zagreb. In August 1993 the 
Croatian entity in Bosnia had founded the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna 
under the lead of the radical nationalist, Boban. But German-U.S. pressure on 
Zagreb was successful and in December 1993 Boban was replaced by a more 
moderate politician. On 1 March 1994 the parties signed a Croat-Muslim 
agreement that created the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, officially 
dissolving the Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna, though in practice the 
Herzeg-Bosna was maintained and was closely connected to Croatia 
economically, fiscally, and administratively, implementing the same laws and 
using the same currency. The common state institutions inside BiH – the 
parliament, government, and presidency – still existed but they no longer 
functioned. In Herzeg-Bosna, like in the Republika Srpska, a state structure had 
been developed after the beginning of the war. Although the Croat-Muslim 
agreement had been signed, the Croatian side still strove for a division of BiH 
based on ethnic identities.93 
Soon, aggression from the Serbian side forced the international 
community to develop another peace plan. The United States, Russia, Great 
Britain, Germany, France, and Italy came up with the Contact Group-Plan in July 
1994, which gave the Federation 51 percent of the territory and the Republika 
Srpska (RS) 49 percent. Against the advice of Milosevic, this plan was rejected 
by the Bosnian Serbs, who feared they would lose much of the territory they had 
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just conquered.94 Fights inside BiH continued as both parties tried to improve 
their initial positions for future peace talks. But the military situation had changed. 
While the Serbian forces had become increasingly war-weary, the Bosnians and 
Croatians were highly motivated and numerically superior. Just after an armistice 
ended on 30 April 1995, the Croats began an offensive in West-Slavonia and 
forced the Serbian population and the military to flee into Serbian-controlled 
territories in west Bosnia.  However, when the attempt of the Armija BiH to free 
Sarajevo from the Serbian siege failed, Serbian vengeance was directed against 
the city of Srebrenica, one of the UN “safe areas”. On 11 July 1995 the Serbian 
military marched into the city without being challenged by the present 
UNPROFOR troops. Their mandate neither allowed them to take actions against 
the aggressors, nor was the UN force strong enough to challenge the aggressor. 
In the five days after Bosnian Serb forces overran Srebrenica, more than 7,000 
Muslim men are thought to have been killed.95 
 In early August 1995 Croatian forces initiated a new wave of ethnic 
cleansing and within a few days had conquered the Serbian-occupied territories 
in Croatia. Almost 200,000 Serbs had to flee. The Serbs responded with artillery 
attacks on Sarajevo. Now, the international community decided to confront this 
barbaric spiral of violence with robust military force. Initial NATO bombardments 
targeted the Serbian artillery around Sarajevo. Shortly after, NATO extended its 
attack to include the Serbian military throughout the territory of the Republika 
Srpska. At the same time, Croatian troops and the Armija BiH attacked the Serbs 
in West Bosnia. By now, Serbian resistance had almost disappeared, so the 
United States and NATO stepped in to stop the Bosnian and Croatian offensive. 
When the conflict finally ended on 11 October 1995, 51.6 percent of BiH territory 
was controlled by the Federation, 48.4 percent by the Republika Srpska. In a 
conference in Geneva on 8 September 1995, Milosevic, who led the talks on 
behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, signaled his willingness to recognize Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina as an independent state; Sarajevo, on the other hand, accepted the 
existence of the Republika Srpska as one of two entities inside the country.  




With the signing of the Dayton Accords, the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Paris on 14 December 1995, 
Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic officially ended a war that had been 
conducted in a way the world had thought impossible in the late twentieth 
century. The armed forces of all the parties had attacked other ethnic groups with 
extreme cruelty and violence. Murder, torture, rape, and ethnic cleansing were 
the daily agenda, and one day’s ally was the next day’s enemy. During the 3.5 
years of war about 200,000 people, almost 5 percent of the population, lost their 
lives, and more than two million were victims of ethnic cleansing. At the end of 
1995 Bosnia and Herzegovina was devastated. One-third of the homes were 
destroyed; the industry and most of the infrastructure had collapsed; the majority 
of the population depended on support from foreign countries and international 
organizations. As a result, the negotiations in Dayton that preceded the signing of 
the agreement were strongly influenced by the impressions and consequences of 
the war. Distrust of the other parties was deep-rooted.97 In his speech in Paris on 
14 December 1995, the Croatian leader Tudjman explained to the world how this 
disaster had happened and why a regional solution to the conflict was impossible 
after the break-up of communist Yugoslavia. For Tudjman, the reasons were 
rooted deep in the particular history of the lands know collectively as the 
Balkans.98  
The importance of history for the behavior and goals of the peoples of the 
Balkans was greatly misunderstood and underestimated by the rest of the world. 
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This wrong assessment by the international community created a blind and fatal 
passivity, so the initial flare-up in the late 1980s could unfold into a full-scale war. 
Unfortunately, the ultimate success of the Dayton Accords would strongly depend 
on the international community’s ability to understand that distrust and aversion 
among the ethnic groups was based not only on the consequences and 
impressions of the war just ended, but also on historical developments that had 
occurred over many centuries.  
However, as President Bill Clinton said in his Paris speech on 14 
December 1995, “no foreign power can guarantee that Muslims, Croats, and 
Serbs can live in Bosnia and Herzegovina as free citizens in one country. This, 
only the Bosnian people can achieve.”   
 
B. THE DAYTON ACCORDS: THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
1. Civilian Aspects  
In signing the Dayton Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia mutually agreed to respect each other’s 
sovereignty. Their future behavior and actions would comply with the UN Charta 
and the documents of the OSCE. They would settle disputes peacefully. The 
constitution of BiH would be based on democratic principles (Annex 4) and 
establish two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Republika Srpska (RS) (Annex 2). They would conduct free, fair, and democratic 
elections, supervised by the OSCE, within six to nine months (Annex 3). Human 
rights would be guaranteed for all people inside BiH and a Commission of Human 
Rights would be established with the assured access of international human-
rights agencies (Annex 6). Refugees and displaced persons could return to their 
homes and regain their property or obtain compensation (Annex 7). Public 
corporations would be established to organize the reconstruction of 
infrastructure, transportation, and the supply of water, gas, and electricity (Annex 
9).  The UN would establish an International Police Task Force (IPTF) to monitor 
and inspect law-enforcement activities and facilities and train and advise local 
law-enforcement personnel (Annex 11). All parties were also thereby obliged to 
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cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations 
of international humanitarian law.99 
Annex 10 of the Dayton Accords designated the appointment by UN 
resolution of a High Representative (HR), described as the highest incontestable 
authority regarding interpretation of civil aspects of the Accords. His tasks were 
to include: monitoring the implementation of the peace agreement, maintaining 
close contact with the contracting parties, coordinating the activities of civil and 
international organizations, providing guidance for the IPTF, and intense and 
close cooperation with the commander of the military implementation force. The 
HR would have no authority over the military, however, and no right to intervene 
in the military chain of command.100 
A peace conference held in London on 8 and 9 December 1995 mobilized 
international support for the implementation of the Dayton Accords and 
established the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). Its membership would 
consist of states and organizations that would actively support the peace 
agreement. The PIC would meet regularly to decide how the goals specified in 
Dayton could best be implemented. In addition, the PIC decided to create a 
steering board to act as its executive body under the control of the HR.101  
 
2. Military Aspects  
Although the Dayton Accords recognize BiH as a sovereign state, the 
agreement also provides for the establishment of an international military peace 
force to help ensure the parties` compliance with provisions concerning the 
military aspects of the peace settlement (Annex 1a). The Implementation Force 
(IFOR) would be under NATO command, supported by willing nations, and 
endowed with a robust UN mandate including the use of force if necessary. IFOR 
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was to monitor the successful establishment of an Inter-Entity-Boundary Line 
(Annex 2)102 and ensure the separation of the three armies, their retreat into their 




Figure 5.   Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton in comparison to the front 
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The overall long-term task was to ensure the establishment of a durable 
cessation of hostilities. Like the civilian HR, the IFOR Commander would be the 
highest military authority and would be responsible for interpreting military 
aspects of the Accords.105       
 
C. THE DEVELOPMENT AFTER DAYTON  
1. Civilian Aspects  
a. Constitutional Issues 
The Dayton Accords gave BiH a Constitution that kept the 
overarching state intentionally weak; otherwise, the Serbian and Croatian sides 
would not have accepted the final version of the agreement. Many of the internal 
committees were given the competency to block decisions by using veto or 
quorum-mechanisms.106 In addition, the Constitution strongly stresses the aspect 
of ethnicity: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the RS would each 
maintain their own parliament, corresponding institutions and constitutions. 
However, both the RS Constitution and the Federation Constitution was designed 
to be the constitution of a sovereign state: both refer to their own specific ethnic 
groups as their only territorial constituents. Consequently, the rights of Serbs 
living in the Federation and of Croats and Bosnians living in the RS are not 
ensured.107 
According to the Accords, the competency and power of the 
overarching state included the areas of foreign policy whereby both entities could 
maintain relations with neighboring states in regard to trade, customs and 
monetary policies, refugee and asylum policies, international criminal 
prosecution, telecommunications, and air traffic control. All other areas, including 
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defense and internal economic activities, were to be maintained at the separate 
entity level.108 “Such minimal federations largely provide for a roof to allow for 
one international point of contact, thus creating external legitimacy, but provide 
little internal legitimacy through institutions and competences.”109 Eventually, 
changes made in the institutional structures after Dayton strengthened the central 
state competences: the number of ministries grew from three to ten and the 
control of state borders and the command of the entities armed forces was 
transferred to the state level. But the discrimination against ethnic minorities, 
inherent in the two entities` constitutions, remained unchanged for five years, 
until 2000 when the Bosnian Constitutional Court declared a number of their 
provisions unconstitutional.110  
However, neither the RS nor the Federation was able to implement 
the Constitutional Court’s decision.  It took two more years and the power of the 
HR to incorporate power-sharing mechanisms and equitable-representation 
principles into the public-administration policies of the two constitutions.111 But 
changes to the Bosnian Constitution did not follow, so provisions that do not 
conform to common constitutional principles still exist. Even today, the “Bosnian 
Constitution contains violations of the political, individual and civil rights of 
Bosnian citizens, and discrimination against national minorities in the electoral 
process.”112 Although the Constitution was an important factor in establishing 
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peace and basic domestic stability immediately after the war, it supported an 
ethnic division of the country and accepted continuing discrimination against 
minorities. Thus, it did not prove to be a “factor for stabilizing Bosnia on a 
democratic basis and for laying the foundations for internal and international 
integration.” 113 
 
b. Social, Political, and Economical Development and the 
Reinforcement of the High Representative 
 In sum, the overarching Bosnian Constitution did little to weaken 
the strong nationalist currents in the country that prevailed after the end of the 
war. Indeed, although the international community supported the implementation 
of the Dayton Accords with manpower and enormous financial means, the three 
ethnic groups that signed the Dayton Accords were simply not automatically able 
or willing to act accordingly. Strong national forces maintained their influence and 
operated openly against the terms and intentions of the agreement. In April 1996, 
the Bosnian Serb Radovan Karadzic, accused of leading the slaughter of 
thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Croatians and indicted by the United Nations 
war crimes tribunal in The Hague, publicly supported the separation of the RS 
from Bosnia.114 Although Karadzic would be isolated politically by the fall of 
1996, at the time strong nationalist currents among the three ethnic groups 
hampered further political, social, and economic progress and development in the 
country. In early 1997, the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA) questioned 
the Dayton Accords and demanded the founding of an independent Bosnian 
state while at the same time, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) was 
postulating  a  pure Croatian entity. The return of refugees and displaced persons  
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was often blocked by official institutions and people avoided freely moving 
around within the country because they feared aggression from one ethnic group 
or another.115  
Although those extreme conditions have improved significantly – 
today people can move freely without being threatened – a common Bosnian 
consciousness has not yet developed. In 2002, the nationalist parties responsible 
for the war atrocities – the HDZ, SDA and SDS – won the elections. In the same 
year, the unemployment rate still exceeded 40 percent.116 In 2003 less than 20 
percent of refugees and displaced persons had returned to their pre-war 
homes117 and half of the population was still living in poverty118.   
In addition, the fact that war criminals like Karadzic were allowed to 
move and act freely within the country signified the major problems that 
continued to split the country and that could not be accepted. As early as 1997, 
the international community had been convinced that a solution to the war-
criminal problem would be decisive for the success of the peace process. 
However, domestic institutions were reluctant to surrender war criminals from 
their own ethnic group. Consequently, the HR decided that communities inside 
Bosnia and Herzegovina that were not supportive in this regard would be 
disciplined by cuts in their share of international aid.119 An additional challenge 
was that the responsibility for the capture of war criminals was not stipulated or 
clarified by the international military agreements. IFOR troops could only be 
tasked to go after war criminals if their national governments would agree. For 
example, it took until July 1997 for Great Britain to permit its troops to actually 
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capture the first war criminal in the region.120 Even today, it requires a “coalition 
of the willing”121 to effect the capture of these offenders. Indeed, in June 2004 at 
the NATO Istanbul Summit, BiH still failed to qualify for entry into NATO’s PfP 
programme mainly because the country is still not able or willing to cooperate 
fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).122 
Today, Radovan Karadzic has still not been captured and Ratko Mladic, the 
former Serbian general and responsible for the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, 
was still paid by the army of the RS in 2002 and harbored in its barracks in 
summer 2004.123 
Due to the stagnating progress in the country, the Peace 
Implementation Council decided in Bonn on 10 December 1997 to significantly 
increase the power of the HR and his political scope of action. The so-called 
“Bonn Powers” gave the HR the ability to increase pressure on domestic 
institutions by setting time limits on projects, decisions, and bills. He could now 
decide about respites, and the locations and responsibilities of meetings of the 
common institutions. In case the parties were unable to reach an agreement, the 
HR now also had the power to decide temporary solutions, which might include 
decrees of laws or actions against certain members of administrative bodies who 
failed to comply with the Dayton Accords or who hampered domestic progress 
and reform.124 
The Spaniard Carlos Westendorp who, on 18 June 1997, became 
the successor of the first HR, Carl Bildt of Sweden, used the new Bonn Powers 
immediately. When two houses of the Bosnian parliament were unable to ratify a 
law over citizenship within a given time frame, Westendorp decided the law was                                             
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to become operative by January 1998.125 Shortly after, he acted accordingly in 
issues about the currency, the common flag, license plates, and more. Though 
the Bonn Powers were used just 38 times in 1998, the number increased to 54 
decisions in 2001 and 153 in 2002. Through the imposition of a universal 
currency, an anthem, a flag, license plates, travel regulations, and numerous 
essential laws, the HR has helped the country by creating at least some of the 
attributes of a state.126 But Westendorp`s actions were not limited solely to 
administrative impositions. According to the Bonn Powers, the HRs gained the 
ability to remove a person from office and replace him with someone they believe 
will act more in accordance with the Dayton Accords. Nor does the HR even have 
to justify his decision. By the end of 2002 more than one hundred persons had 
been dismissed. The present HR, since May 2002, Lord Paddy Ashdown of 
Great Britain, currently imposes approximately fourteen decisions per month.127 
However, several of those cases were more than questionable. For 
example, in 1998 the HR removed a leading Serbian politician, Dragan Cavic, for 
inciting violence against SFOR. Later, Westendorp apologized for that decision 
and in November 2002, Cavic was elected president of the Republika Srpska.128 
In 2000, the HR instigated a plan to accelerate reforms in the judicial sector. A 
newly created Independent Judicial Commission (IJC) would oversee the judges 
and public prosecutors to assure their integrity and reliability. However, the work 
of the IJC was initiated by public complaints and such complaints rarely occurred, 
so that the work of the IJC was stopped in 2002. A strategy based on complaint 
and investigation had failed. Consequently, the HR decided that all judges and 
prosecutors must resign and reapply for their positions.129 This action revoked an 
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immediate protest from the international community. The Council of Europe 
concluded that “problems have to be resolved in a constitutional and legal 
manner, respecting the very principles justifying the presence of the international 
community in Bosnia. If the international community is not willing to abide by its 
own principles when faced by major difficulties, what can be expected from local 
politicians?”130 On 14 June 2002, Paddy Ashdown dismissed the Federation’s 
finance minister who had refused to resign voluntarily after being incriminated in 
a political scandal although there was little evidence. Alija Izetbegovic, one of the 
signers of the Daytona Accords and, at the time, a member of the BiH 
presidency, strongly objected: “In Sarajevo, they remove a man, label him 
dishonest, do not present proof of this, and then talk to us about human 
rights…They want us to take their word for it.”131 
However, the overall response to the HR`s rather sweeping use of 
the Bonn Powers was surprisingly less critical. Indeed, a popular weekly 
magazine published in Sarajevo argued that the role of the HR represented a 
great help for the democratic process in Bosnia because the present political 
forces were unable to deal with the challenges. A newspaper honored the HR 
and his powers which, it said, “need no coalitions or consensus to impose 
packages and to work for the general well-being.”132 The actions of the HR as 
based on the Bonn Powers obviously had led to a kind of dependency syndrome 
and that hampered the development of political responsibility. Still today, the 
political parties in Bosnia rely on the HR whenever inconvenient decisions have 
to be made.133 
                                            
130 Gerald Knaus und Felix Martin, “Travails of the European Raj,“ Journal of Democracy 
Volume 14, Number 3 (July 2003): 65 
http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/KnausandMartin.pdf  (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
131 Ibid. 66  
132 Ibid. 67 
133 Wolfgang Petritsch, Bosnien und Herzegowina 5 Jahre nach Dayton-Hat der Friede eine 
Chance? (Klagenfurt, Wien, Ljubljana, Tuzla, Sarajewo: Wieser Verlag, 2001), 125 
59 
c. From the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) to 
the European Police Mission (EUPM) 
 In keeping with Annex 11 of the Daytona Accords, the UN 
established the IPTF as one major part of their overarching mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.134 Some specified IPTF tasks were: 
• monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities and 
facilities, including associated judicial organizations, structures and 
proceedings  
• advising law enforcement personnel and forces  
• training law enforcement personnel  
• facilitating, within the IPTF mission of assistance, the parties' law 
enforcement activities  
• assessing threats to public order and advising on the capability of 
law enforcement agencies to deal with such threats  
• advising government authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 
organization of effective civilian law enforcement agencies  
• assisting by accompanying the parties' law enforcement personnel 
as they carry out their responsibilities, as the Task Force deems 
appropriate.135 
 
When the nearly 2,000 international police officers established their 
headquarters in Sarajevo, they faced a domestic police force that was strongly 
molded and influenced by the war. The Bosnian police forces were organized in 
three parallel structures, each representing one ethnicity. Thus, they were 
essentially “mono-ethnic paramilitary units that were not suitable to civilian law 
enforcement ... and that continued to discriminate against, harass and intimidate 
citizens who were not of their own ethnicity. Moreover, police forces were corrupt 
and politically dominated.”136 
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Although the internal situation in Bosnia gradually stabilized, it was 
obvious to the international community that the initial approach to creating a 
functioning Bosnian police was not sufficient. Sustainable police force reform and 
restructuring needed more than just training support and co-location. 
Consequently, the UN came up with a program that additionally addressed 
issues concerning the individual police officer’s, the law enforcement institutions, 
and the relationship between the police and the public. The goals of the program 
were the certification of individual officers, the accreditation of police 
administrations, and the establishment of self-sustaining mechanisms for state 
and regional level inter-police force cooperation.137 
By the end of the IPTF mission in December 2002, the primary 
focus of the local police had changed from the security of the state to the security 
of the individual. Moreover, the IPTF had helped to recreate multi-ethnic police 
forces.138 
When the European Police Mission (EUPM) took over from the 
IPTF on 1 January 2003, it marked the beginning of the EU´s very first crisis 
management mission within the framework of the ESDP.  The EUPM maintained 
the same headquarters that had been used by the IPTF in Sarajevo. However, 
the chain of command was different: a Police Commissioner took over 
operational command of the mission. He reports to the European Union Special 
Representative   (EUSR),   Paddy   Ashdown,139   who   reports,  in  turn,  to  the  
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Secretary General/High Representative, Javier Solana. The Political and Security 
Committee (PSC) exercises political control and strategic direction of the 
mission.140  
BiH’s increasing stability allowed a reduction of personnel to 550 
international police officers and 300 local staff.  A domestic State Information and 
Protection Agency (SIPA) were created, representing a genuine state-level police 
force. While the IPTF still had an operational mandate, EUPM officers would not 
be present to observe Bosnian police operation. The EUPM would strengthen the 
domestic policing structures put in place by the IPTF by monitoring, mentoring, 
and inspecting the managerial and operational capacities of the Bosnian police. 
Key issues now include two dominant domestic challenges: the provision of a 
secure environment for returnees and the fight against organized crime and 
corruption. 141 
  
2. Military Aspects – From IFOR until the End of SFOR  
NATO started Operation Joint Endeavor on 20 December 1995, and within 
a few weeks nearly 60,000 IFOR soldiers from more than 30 countries – many of 
them non-NATO members – were deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
territory was structured in three sectors with one Multinational Division deployed 
in each sector. Each of the three leading nations was given command over a 
sector: the British established headquarters in Banja Luka and took over the 
sector South-West; the United States was given the sector North and their 
military pitched its headquarters in Tuzla.  
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Figure 6.   IFOR Zones of Operation142 
 
Finally, France would command the sector South-East with headquarters 
in Mostar. The overarching IFOR headquarters was established in Sarajevo. The 
SACEUR was the overall military authority.143 
IFOR’s robust mandate paved the way for the end of open hostilities and 
fights among the Serbs, Croatians and Bosnians. The three armies were 
successfully separated and their partial demobilization went off as scheduled. 
However, the internal social and political environment of BiH remained highly 
fragile and insecure. By the end of 1996, IFOR had successfully implemented the 
peace. It was now up to NATO to stabilize this peace, a task reflected in the 
name of the new force: Stabilization Force (SFOR). Operation Joint Endeavor 
ended on 20 December 1996 and was replaced by Operation Joint Guard. 
SFOR was tasked to deter hostilities and contribute to a secure 
environment by providing continued presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
support key areas including primary civil implementation organizations, and 
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progress towards a lasting consolidation of peace without further need for NATO-
led military forces inside the country. SFOR would have to ensure that: 
 
• all parties adhere to the military requirements of the Dayton 
Accords on a sustained basis 
• all parties demonstrate commitment to continue negotiations as a 
means to resolve political and military differences 
• all parties demonstrate commitment to continue negotiations as a 
means to resolve political and military differences 
• established civil structures are sufficiently mature to assume 
responsibilities to continue monitoring compliance with the Accords 
• Conditions have been established for the safe continuation of 
ongoing nation-building activities.”144 
 
When SFOR took over from IFOR, it consisted of approximately 32,000 
troops, roughly half of its predecessor’s mission.145 In June 1998 this number 
was slightly reduced and the operation was renamed Operation Joint Forge.146 
Taking into account the improved security situation in BiH, the first major 
restructuring was first decided at the end of 1999 and, later, in early 2003. By 
2000, the SFOR headquarter in Sarajevo had moved to the purpose-built Camp 
Butmir and by January 2003, SFOR was reduced to 12,000 troops. In addition, 
the Multinational Divisions inside the sectors were given up and replaced by 
Multinational Brigades. The brigades contained distinct battle groups. These 
battle  groups  could  be  multinational  as well  and  were  essentially  reinforced  
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battalion task forces with their own organic capabilities. Finally, there would be a 
capability to bring strategic reserve forces quickly into Bosnia and Herzegovina if 
they are needed.147 
Due to the increased role played by the Bosnian authorities in providing a 
secure and safe environment for their citizens, by June 2004 SFOR adopted a 
new operational profile, the so-called “Deterrent Presence”. This approach was 
reflected in a reduction of troops down to approximately 7,000 and the 
Multinational Brigades established in 2003 were renamed Multinational Task 
Forces (MNTFs). Each MNTF consists of approximately 1.800 persons. The new 
NATO profile was based on the quick availability of tactical, operational and 
strategic reserves and a comprehensive “Situational Awareness” about the 
situation and development in the country.148 Consequently, the concept of liaison 
teams that had proved successful in Macedonia was introduced in BiH as well. 
As in Macedonia, many of the Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) were 
accommodated in houses, so-called “field houses”, in local communities. 
Alternatively, SFOR established so-called “field offices” and LOT offices in the 
main camps. More than 40 teams of approximately twelve soldiers each were 
spread throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. “Their main tasks were: 
• Operate with direct contact with local population, institutions and 
the international community  
• Responsible for local co-ordination and liaison with the international 
community (to include Non-Governmental Organizations), regional/ 
local civil and police authorities, and the population 
• Monitor the political, economic, and social developments and focus 
on indicators and warnings 
• Build trust and confidence among international actors and service 
organizations contributing to the development of BiH 
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• Monitor the progress and interaction of the international community 
to evaluate the degree of positive interaction, and identify any 
problem areas where SFOR can encourage solutions.” 149 
SFOR’s mission ended successfully on 2 December 2004, almost nine 
years after NATO had deployed its forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On this 
date, the EU and its military force, EUFOR, assumed responsibility for the 
implementation of Annex 1a and 2 of the Dayton Accords. 
 
3. Findings 
 In comparison to most of its neighbor states, BiH’s political, social and 
economical progress since the end of the war has been comparatively weak, 
even though the country has received extensive support from the international 
community. Today, it faces a weak economy with high unemployment and poor 
living standards. Although open hostility among the three ethnic groups has 
ceased and the separation of combatants is no longer a factor that threat has 
been replaced by security challenges such as organized crime and corruption. 
“The real transformation to a viable and democratic European country is still very 
much an unfinished business.”150 
The Bosnian Constitution created in Dayton has failed to be the basis for a 
functioning democratic Bosnian-Herzegovinian state. It allows the Federation and 
the RS to have their own state apparatus, which, in combination with their 
constitution, supports nationalistic currents and their own ethnic group and 
discriminates against ethnic minorities. Although the entities constitutions were 
partially amended following the Constitutional Court’s decision in 2002, 
discrimination against ethnic minorities has not been abolished. These 
circumstances, in conjunction with Bosnia’s complex history, ensure and support 
a continuing ethnic division and hamper the development of an overarching 
“Bosnian-Herzegovinian consciousness.” In 2002, the nationalist parties that 
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were responsible for the atrocities in the war – the HDZ, SDA and SDS – won the 
elections. In addition, the number of returned refugees and displaced people is 
still very small. More than 80 percent still have not returned to their pre-war 
homes. Also, the entities` cooperation regarding the capture of war criminals is 
still insufficient. They are not fully willing to surrender a suspect if he belongs to 
their own ethnic group. This is particularly applicable for the Republika Srpska. 
“This failure has become a fundamental obstacle to BiH’s continuing progress 
towards Euro-Atlantic structures: the authorities of the RS must address this 
issue as a matter of urgency if the country as a whole is to move forward.”151 
As long as the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Constitution gives the two entities 
the current power, the nationalist currents inside the country will most likely 
prevail and social, political, and economical progress in terms of a Bosnian state 
will be very difficult to achieve.  The progress achieved in BiH so far was largely 
due to the HR and the enormous power he had been given. Although his way of 
making decisions has not always been an example of ideal democracy, his 
decisions and laws have certainly supported internal development. Nonetheless, 
his way has also hampered the development of a democratic culture not only 
among Bosnian politicians but also among Bosnian citizens. It is questionable 
whether it makes sense for the HR to impose decisions, rather than driving the 
population and the politicians to find acceptable compromises, especially in a 
country that is supposed to learn how to live according to democratic principles.  
The effort and commitment of the International Police Task Force and its 
successor, the European Police Mission, created sufficient stability in the country 
that the number of international police officers could be significantly reduced and 
their mission limited to monitoring, mentoring and inspecting the work of newly 
created domestic policing structures. Since January 2003, the EU has been 
responsible for the development of an effective domestic police force. The 
takeover from the IPTF went smoothly and the internal progress achieved by the 
IPTF inside Bosnia and Herzegovina was continued by the EUPM. This success 
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demonstrates not only the readiness of the EU to take on crisis management 
missions at the civilian level, but also its strong commitment to its European 
Security and Defense  Policy and the will to become an important political player.  
BiH’s increasing internal stability is also reflected in the continuing 
reduction of international military forces. While the international community under 
the lead of NATO began the mission in BiH with almost 60,000 soldiers, by 2004 
the number of troops could be downsized to 7,000. Moreover, SFOR adapted its 
military structure to the domestic developments and current challenges by 
introducing highly flexible LOTs that had proved effective during operation 
Concordia in Macedonia. With their open and transparent approach toward the 
people of Bosnia and Herzegovina the LOTs have contributed significantly to the 
improved security situation in the country. This positive development and the 
increased role played by Bosnian authorities paved the way for the transition 
from NATO to the European Union.152 
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V. THE EUROPEAN FORCES IN BOSNIA: OPERATION 
“ALTHEA”  
A. BACKGROUND 
At the summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, the EU expressed its 
willingness to take over responsibility for a military operation in Bosnia. This 
willingness demonstrated the EU’s recently developed military capabilities and 
signaled the EU’s commitment to BiH itself. What was even more significant was 
the EU’s provision of an integrated approach that connected the various players 
and elements: the EU Special Representative (EUSR), Paddy Ashdown, who is 
also the High Representative (HR) in BiH; the EU Police Mission (EUPM), the 
CARDS153 program and a possible EU-led military operation.154 
The EU made very clear that any such military operation would be 
conducted in close cooperation with NATO and would be based on the Berlin-
Plus arrangement, which was eventually concluded in March 2003. At that time, 
the U.S. response to the EU approach was rather reserved because of Iraq. 
From a U.S. perspective, the time was not ripe for such an EU commitment. It 
took the Bush administration until the fall of 2003 to adopt a more positive 
attitude towards the EU’s offer.155 
Apparently, the success in 2003 of the EU and Berlin-Plus in operation 
Concordia in Macedonia convinced the United States that the Europeans should 
get their chance in Bosnia. In early 2004 the EU developed the “General 
Concept” followed by the “Military Strategic Option Directive” and the “Military 
Strategic Option.”  At the NATO Istanbul Summit on 28 June 2004 the heads of 
state and government of the NATO countries decided to terminate the SFOR 
mission in BiH by the end of 2004. At the same time, the willingness of the                                             
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(accessed Apr. 21, 2005)  
155 Horst Bacia, “Europas neue Aufgabe,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No.283, 10, 03 
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European Union to establish a follow-on mission was strongly welcomed; and 
NATO’s support for an EU-led military operation was confirmed, based on the 
existing NATO-EU Berlin-Plus arrangement. On 9 July, the United Nations 
extended SFOR’s mandate in BiH and welcomed the EU’s intention to take on 
the responsibility after NATO ended its mission. On 12 July, the EU signed the 
“Council Joint Action”, thereby agreeing to conduct a military mission in BiH.  On 
27 July, the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) was given 
the Military Initiating Directive, the foundation document required for the 
European Union Operation Commander (EU OPCDR) to conduct planning of the 
operation.156 The Concept of Operation (CONOPS) was agreed to by the Council 
on 13 September and the Force Generation Conference was held successfully 
on 15 September.157 The Operational Plan (OPLAN) for operation “Althea” was 
approved on 11 October.158 Like its role in operation Concordia in Macedonia, 
the EU did not establish its own Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with BiH. 
The existing agreement between NATO and the country granted far- reaching 
rights and possibilities to the forces. A new, independent EU SOFA would have 
been much more limited. Consequently, the EU followed the advice of its legal 
advisors to join the existing NATO SOFA.159   
Finally, on 22 November the UN mandated the EU “to establish for an 
initial planned period of 12 months a multinational stabilization force (EUFOR) as 
a legal successor to SFOR under unified command and control, which will fulfil its 
missions in relation to the implementation of Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the 
Peace Agreement in cooperation with the NATO HQ presence in accordance 
                                            
156 The Council of the European Union, “EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(EUFOR-Althea),” http://ue.eu.int/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=745&lang=en  (accessed Apr. 21, 
2005) 
157 The Council of the European Union, “Summary of the remarks made by Javier SOLANA, 
EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, at the informal MEETING 
OF EU DEFENCE MINISTERS Noordwijk, 17 September 2004,” 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Noordwijk%2017.09.04.pdf   (accessed Apr. 21, 2005) 
158 International Security Information Service Europe, “ESDP takes over from NATO: 
Operation ALTHEA, coherent, effective and democratically accountable?” http://www.isis-
europe.org/ftp/ Download/ESR%2024%20-%20Operation%20Althea.PDF  (accessed Apr. 21, 
2005) 
159 Rainer Feist (Admiral, ret.), e-mail to the author, Nov. 7, 2004 
71 
with the arrangements agreed between NATO and the EU as communicated to 
the Security Council in their letters of 19 November 2004, which recognize that 
the EUFOR will have the main peace stabilization role under the military aspects 
of the Peace Agreement.”160 The transfer of authority from SFOR to EUFOR and 
the launch of operation Althea took place on 2 December 2004.  The 7,000 
troops formerly under the command of NATO generally stayed inside BiH. 
Besides the United States, most of the countries that had contributed to SFOR 
stayed in the country.  From 2 December on, EUFOR consisted of troops from 
twenty-two EU member states and eleven non-EU countries. 
 
B. OBJECTIVES 
1. Political Objectives 
The European Union’s intense overall commitment to BiH is reflected in its 
coherent approach in supporting the country’s social, political, and economic 
progress. Consequently, “Althea will add to the EU's political engagement, its 
assistance programs and its ongoing police and monitoring missions.”161 Thus, 
EUFOR now actively supports the tasks of the EU Special Representative/High 
Representative, the EU Police Mission (EUPM), the EU Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM), the EU Customs and Financial Assistance Office (EU CAFAO), as well 
as other international actors such as the OSCE that support development in BiH. 
 The EU’s long-term political objective for BiH is a “stable, viable, peaceful 
and multiethnic BiH, co-operating peacefully with its neighbors and irreversibly on 
track towards EU membership.”162 To achieve this objective it was initially 
necessary “to ensure a seamless transition from NATO-led SFOR to EUFOR in 
order to help maintain a secure environment for the implementation of the Dayton 
Accords and to strengthen the local capacity building through support of the BiH 
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authorities in implementing the conditions in the Stabilization and Association 
Process (SAP) feasibility study.163,164 These short-term goals lead to the EU’s 
medium-term political objectives: “Supporting BiH’s progress towards EU 
integration by its own efforts, by contributing to a safe and secure environment 
with the objective of signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). 
This complements the HR/EUSR’s Mission Implementation Plan (MIP)165 and the 
end of the EU’s executive role in peace implementation, including through 
gradual transfer of ownership to BiH authorities.”166  
 
2. Military Objectives 
To support the EU’s short- and medium-term political goals and those of 
United Nations resolution 1575, the EU formulated the following overarching 
military objectives for Althea: fulfil the role specified in Annexes 1a and 2 of the 
Dayton Accords and contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH to 
support the achievement of the necessary political and economic reforms, as 
outlined in the MIP and the SAP.167 
According to those objectives several military tasks were developed: 
• Provide a robust military presence in order to deter the former 
Entity Armed Forces and other armed groups, monitor and ensure 
continued compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton 
Accords and prevent a resumption of violence. 
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• Contribute to a safe and secure environment, support the 
HR/EUSR’s MIP and prevent efforts to reverse peace 
implementation, so that all EU and other actors of the international 
community may carry out their responsibility whilst ensuring own 
force protection and freedom of movement. This includes support 
for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
and other relevant authorities. 
• Maintain and enhance a robust Situational Awareness to be able to 
maintain a safe and secure environment.  
• Manage any residual aspects of the Dayton Accords including 
airspace management, advice on de-mining and ordnance disposal, 
and weapon collection programs. 
• Provide support, within means and capabilities, in co-ordination with 
the EU and International Community actors, to the MIP’s core 
tasks. 
• Provide support to other civil implementation organizations 
regarding counter-terrorism, the fight against organized crime, the 
return of refugees and displaced people.168 
NATO did not give up its long-term commitment to BiH and maintained its 
headquarters in Camp Butmir in Sarajevo. “NATO will continue to assist the 
country to meet requirements for the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program 
and eventually membership in the NATO alliance. NATO will also undertake 
certain operational tasks, including counter-terrorism whilst ensuring force 
protection, support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, with regard to the detention of persons indicted for war crimes and 
intelligence sharing with the EU.”169  
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C. RISK ASSESSMENT 
 The war in BiH that ended with the December 1995 signing of the Dayton 
Accords devastated the country’s infrastructure as well as the trust among the 
three ethnic groups forming BiH’s society. With major help and support of the 
international community the infrastructure could mostly be re-established. 
Although the entities Ministries of Defense continued to exist, a state-level 
Ministry of Defense has been established. An outbreak of hostilities between 
Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian military units is very unlikely. Thus, EUFOR’s 
main challenge will not be the separation of combatants. 
Distrust among the ethnic groups, however, is still very present today. The 
three nationalistic parties – the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the Bosnian 
Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Croatian Democratic Community 
(HDZ) – are still the leading political powers in the country and continue to 
hamper significant political, social, and economical progress. Additionally, ethnic 
division is supported by the entities` constitutions because they openly 
discriminate against the other ethnic groups. Particularly in the Republika Srpska, 
Serbian war criminals are still protected and covered by officials. Neither the 
population nor the politicians have fully accepted a common state Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This lack of mutual thinking among the population also hampers 
sound economic development. The weak economic situation with a high 
unemployment rate and low-paying jobs makes parts of the population receptive 
to criminal activities and corruption. A further declining economy combined with 
the frequent dismissal of employees, the inability of companies to pay salaries, 
and decisions made by the High Representative to enforce the reform process –
such as actions against potential war criminals and corrupt politicians – can lead 
to open protests among the population of an affected ethnic group. Measures 
against criminal organizations can also result in violent reactions and open fights.  
Although policing structures in BiH are being developed with the support of 
the EU, their power and ability to face the widespread organized crime is still very 
limited. “The resistance to ethnic integration, the bleak economic outlook with 
rising unemployment and widespread corruption within government institutions 
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might therefore induce civil unrest and disorder as a consequence, as unrealistic 
local expectations continue to be frustrated. Organized Crime and extremism 
continue to be a threat to stability.”170 
   
D. ALTHEA`S COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE 
Inspired by their extraordinarily positive experience with the Berlin-Plus 
arrangement during operation Concordia in Macedonia, the EU and NATO 
agreed as early as summer 2004 to make certain NATO assets and capabilities 
available to the EU for an operation in BiH. The EU was granted the use of NATO 
headquarters as well as access to NATO planning.  
With the “Council Joint Action of 12 July 2004 on the European Union 
military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” the EU’s PSC was given, under 
the responsibility of the Council, the political control and strategic direction of the 
EU-led military operation. This authorization includes the power to amend 
planning documents, the Chain of Command, and the Rules of Engagement, and 
to make further decisions on the appointment of the EU OPCDR and the EU 
FCDR. The powers of decision with respect to the objectives and termination of 
the EU military operation remain with the EU Council. The EU OHQ was 
established at SHAPE and the DSACEUR Admiral Rainer Feist was appointed 
EU OPCDR. The German flag officer retired at the end of September 2004 and 
was replaced by the British General Sir John Reith. In addition, another British 
officer, Major General David Leakey, was appointed EU FCDR in BiH.171 As it 
had been done during operation Concordia, an EUSG was integrated into 
SHAPE’s Strategic Direction Center to ensure full transparency for EU members 
that are not NATO members. The EUSG was formed as early as summer 
2004172 and consists of officers from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, 
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Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Again, the 
group is directed by a Swedish naval captain.173 
While the members of the EUSG were double-hatted during operation 
Concordia, this time all officers concentrate solely on operation Althea. All 
nations participating in the EUSG sent additional personnel to staff the group. 
Moreover, even the non-NATO officers can now move unescorted inside SHAPE. 
Their access to important and relevant areas and information is ensured and 
regulated.  The exchange of information between the two organizations happens 
through a secure mail guard system or simply through personal 
communication.174  
Another lesson learned from Concordia, the establishment of a DSACEUR 
liaison at the EUMS, was also maintained. It is now called the “NATO Liaison 
Arrangement.”175 
Furthermore, JFC Naples, the headquarters that is responsible for NATO’s 
Balkan operations, is again integrated into the EU’s command and control 
structure. This ensures that EUFOR can make use of NATO’s operational 
reserves in the Balkans if necessary. As with Concordia, a European Union 
Command Element (EUCE) is integrated into the JFC Regional Operation Center 
(ROC). At the time the decision to name the head of the EUCE was made the 
deputy commander of the JFC was staffed by Great Britain. To avoid a solely 
British chain of command – the DSACEUR, the Head of the EUCE, and the EU 
FCDR in BiH, all were British officers – the proven Head of EUCE during 
Concordia, Italian JFC Chief of Staff (COS) Lieutenant General Cocozza, was 
appointed Head of EUCE for operation Althea as well.176 Like the EUSG at 
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SHAPE, the EUCE was formed as early as summer 2004 and consists of officers 



















Figure 7.   Althea’s Command and Control Structure 
 
   In BiH the EU has established headquarters in Camp Butmir
collocated with the NATO HQ. It became fully operational under the c
the EU FCDR, British Major General Leakey, on 1 December 2004. I
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first lead nation for Althea.  
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and plan for the forthcoming EU-led military operation. This preparation included 
not only operational planning but also external liaison with other institutions and 
organizations such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the EUPM, 
and the OSCE. Of highest importance, the EU implemented close cooperation 
with the NATO HQ to ensure a seamless transition and handover of the mission 
from NATO to the EU.179 The EUFOR HQ`s staff was manned from October 
2004 on. The personnel were initially integrated into the corresponding SFOR 
branches and were trained on the job. Key leaders, such as Task Force 
Commanders, branch chiefs, and above, had to undergo special training, 
consisting of three phases. The first phase, the so-called “mission orientation,” 
contained briefings from Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative and Special 
Representative, local politicians, university professors, and the EU OPCDR. 
During the second phase, the “Ground Orientation,” the officers visited the 
different headquarters and the key geographic areas of BiH. Finally, during the 
“Exercise” phase, the leaders conducted discussions about possible 
developments inside the country and how to react appropriately. In addition, in a 
brief exercise the staff had to demonstrate that they were capable and ready to 
face challenges that went beyond the daily routine.180 
Below the EUFOR HQ in Camp Butmir the EU maintained the force 
structure that had proven successfully during the SFOR operation. Consequently, 
the three existing MNTFs were integrated into the EUFOR command and control 
structure. Again, an overwhelming majority of the SFOR countries maintained 
their commitment to BiH, leaving their forces in the country under EUFOR 
command. Great Britain maintained its leading role in the MNTF North-West 
(NW), and Italy, having been a participating country during SFOR, took over the 
command of the MNTF South-East (SE) in March 2005. The United States had 
commanded the MNTF North (N) during SFOR, but having ended its commitment 
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in BiH after the transfer of authority from SFOR to EUFOR, the U.S. contingent 





Figure 8.   MNTF’s Areas of Responsibility (AOR)182 
 
The three Multinational Task Forces have a defined area of responsibility 
but the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) – since 2 December 2004 the successor of 
the Multinational Specialized Unit – can be deployed throughout BiH. The core of 
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this unit is the Italian Carabinieri, a flexible and versatile unit deployable in post-
conflict crisis situations and synthesis of military attitude and police capability.183 
To ensure a seamless command and control capability from the EU 
OPCDR at the EU OHQ in SHAPE through the EUCE at JFC Naples and the 
EUFOR HQ in Camp Butmir down to the MNTFs, NATO made its networks and 
phone lines available to the EU.  The OPCDR on the strategic level receives a 
Weekly Situation Report and a Monthly Assessment Report from the FCDR 
through the COS EUCE. In addition, NATO’s support ensures the communication 
and information flow on the EUFOR HQ level as well as on the MNTF level.184 
 
E. FORCE COMPOSITION 
 EUFOR consists of approximately 7,000 troops from twenty-two EU 
member states and eleven third countries. A majority of the personnel are 
assigned to the three MNTFs: each has approximately 1,800 soldiers. The EU 
FCDR, British Major General Leakey, has also approximately 1,000 theatre 
troops at his disposal which are based at various locations in BiH.185 Another 
EUFOR asset, the IPU, has strength of approximately 530 officers. “This unit 
consists of its headquarters in Sarajevo, of a mobile element that usually carries 
out normal framework operations, civil disturbance operations and quick reaction 
force operations, of a specialized element that consists of 5 investigation teams 
and 1 operational support team and of a logistic element that consists of units for 
logistic supply and maintenance.”186 
Each of the MNTFs has its own headquarters, a signal unit, a command 
and information unit, a medical unit, a multinational integrated logistic unit, a 
helicopter unit, a military police unit, and a maneuver battalion, consisting of 
three maneuver companies as deterrent components. These battalions are 
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equipped with lightly armored vehicles and light infantry weapons. If necessary, 
EUFOR will have access to operational reserve forces through the Commander 
JFC Naples and the head of EUCE, and to strategic reserve forces through the 
SACEUR and the EU OPCDR (DSACEUR) at SHAPE. In addition, reflecting the 
high importance of intelligence operations for the success of operation Althea, 
each MNTF includes a Situational Awareness Structure consisting of one 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Company, Verification 
Teams (VT), and Liaison Observation Teams (LOT).187  
 The ISR companies consist of intelligence platoons, light- armored 
reconnaissance platoons, and electronic warfare platoons.  The companies are 
tasked to collect information that may be important for the protection of EUFOR 
and for the successful execution of the operation. Their tasks include the 
observation of extremist groups, irregular forces, and criminal organizations as 
well as communication with the local population in order to sense possible 
changes in attitude and mindset. The VT’s main task is to observe the actions of 
the Entity Armed Forces, their transformation in compliance with the Dayton 
Accords and the reduction of the weapon storage sites and the ammunition 
storage sites. Consequently, the VTs consist of inspection and control platoons 
and documentation platoons.188  
 The third element of the Situational Awareness Structure, the LOT, was 
introduced into BiH in June 2004 after this concept had been extraordinarily 
successful during operation Concordia in Macedonia in 2003. To stress the 
importance of the LOTs for the success of operation Althea, the LOT concept of 
operations and the tasks and training of the personnel will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section.  
  
F. LIAISON AND OBSERVATION TEAMS 
 Taking into account the current security situation in BiH and the necessity 
for forces to be able to react quickly to any possibly evolving unrest among the 
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population, the maintenance of the situational awareness became an issue of 
highest priority for the international community (IC) and their forces in BiH.  The 
IC needed an instrument to “feel the pulse”189 of the country, that is, to provide 
information about the evolving political, economic, social, environmental, and 
security situation in BiH. As early as June 2004 NATO introduced LOTs into 
SFOR. Many of those teams were accommodated in houses in local 
communities, so-called “field houses” and were tasked to keep close contact with 
the local people.190 Alternatively, SFOR established so-called “field offices” and 
LOT offices in the main force camps. 
The acceptance of the LOTs and, particularly, their accommodation in field 
houses was extraordinarily high among the BiH population. A poll conducted by 
the so-called “Salamander Task Force” at the end of 2004 shows that 86 percent 
of the BiH population confided in the LOTs and 80 percent would inform the 
LOTs in times of threat. Furthermore, the poll demonstrates that the common 
people are more willing to report incidents or threats to LOTs in field houses than 
to field offices or camps.191  
Since spring 2005, the importance of the LOTs in regard to the 
maintenance of situation awareness is reflected in an overarching EUFOR 
concept, central to the deployment and tasking of the teams and the selection 
and training of LOT personnel. The LOTs, acting as the “public face” of EUFOR, 
collect overt information through close contact and open communication with the 
local population and agencies and by proactive liaison with international 
organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and local 
representatives of the BiH Armed Forces. In order to gain the trust and 
confidence of the local people, the LOTs will be based in field houses unless they 
are deployed in the close vicinity of larger cities or EUFOR camps. The number 
of LOTs in the three MNTFs may vary depending on the particular requirements 
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of each area of responsibility. Each team, however, will contain between six and 
eight members from different rank, gender, and age groups, but a single nation, 
plus two interpreters. This structure will not only overcome the language barrier 
but will also make it easier for the LOTs to have access to different local social 
levels. Each member of a LOT must have a distinct capability to work and 
cooperate in a team, must be able to cope with high physical and psychological 
stress, and must have a calm, balanced, and mature personality. Before the LOT 
personnel are deployed, they must be trained and educated in Bosnian history, 
including an overview of the war, the current situation in the country, and future 
potential challenges. Additionally, the personnel must learn about the social, 
political, and economical situation as well as the structure of significant 
international organizations that support the development of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Finally, the LOT members will receive mission-oriented and in-
theater training that covers operational issues.192 
  
G. THE DEVELOPMENT AFTER 2 DECEMBER 2004 
Right after the transfer of authority from SFOR to EUFOR on 2 December 
2004, the EU demonstrated its strong commitment to BiH and its coherent 
approach to supporting the country’s social and political progress by taking 
coordinated measures against the Republika Srpska (RS), the entity that still 
does not fully comply with the Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). On 16 December 2004, Lord Ashdown, in his function as the High 
Representative, removed nine high-ranked police officers and blocked bank 
accounts of persons suspected of actively supporting war criminals.193 In 
addition, he announced that by the end of 2005 the entities` ministries of defense 
and police would cease to exist.  Thereafter, their functions would be carried out 
by the state of Bosnian and Herzegovina. More emphatically, he directly 
threatened the RS: 
                                            
192 Document consulted by author. 
193 Michael Martens, “Bosnische Serben widersetzen sich dem Hohen Vertreter Ashdown,“ 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No.301, 2, Dec. 24, 2004 
84 
If the RS, and because of it, BiH fails a third time – then I need to 
make it very clear that I will not hesitate to take measures that deal, 
directly and powerfully, with the assets and institutions of the RS.  
And I can tell you now, no options are currently ruled out, if it comes 
to this.194  
On the same day, EUFOR started inspections of Bosnian Serb military 
facilities in Crna Rijeka near Han Pijesak, the place where the Bosnian Serb 
Army had its headquarters during the war. Strong evidence suggested that those 
well-designed and -constructed facilities were used by persons accused of war 
crimes within the preceding few years. On 23 December 2004, British Major 
General Leakey, the EU FCDR, announced that “all underground military facilities 
in Crna Rijeka, along with other bunkers and underground military facilities 
located within a radius of a few kilometres will be sealed on suspicion that they 
are being used to hide persons indicted for war crimes.”195  
These measures and announcements were strongly opposed by high-level 
Bosnian Serb politicians and condemned as being undemocratic and illegal. 
Blaming Ashdown, the Bosnian Serbs claimed that the measures destabilized the 
country and violated the Dayton Accords. As a protest against Ashdown’s 
announcement, several Bosnian Serb politicians, including the BiH foreign 
minister and the prime minister of the Republika Srpska, resigned.196  
By end of January 2005 EUFOR had searched 119 military locations that 
intelligence experts believed could be used by war criminals as hideouts. The 
sustained pressure created by the coordinated measures of the HR and EUFOR 
finally forced the RS authorities on 15 January 2005 to transfer a potential war 
criminal to ICTY in The Hague, the first transfer of an ICTY indictee in nine 
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years.197 In February, a Monitoring Group for Cooperation with the ICTY was 
established and tasked to strengthen coordination between all agencies and 
institutions in BiH responsible for ensuring full cooperation with The Hague. The 
group will be chaired by the BiH Prime Minister Adnan Terzic and the High 
Representative and will include officials from the state and entity authorities as 
well as representatives of EUFOR, NATO, and the European Police Mission 
(EUPM).198 By the end of March, several former army commanders and generals 
had surrendered to The Hague.199 
EUFOR’s commitment and activities also include the fight against 
organized crime. In close cooperation with the EUPM – a EUPM officer is 
attached to EUFOR at the various command levels – and the EU Customs and 
Financial Assistance Office, EUFOR troops support the local law-enforcement 
agencies in tackling organized criminal networks.200 At the beginning of April, 
550 additional soldiers from the Italian Alpini regiment were deployed in the 
country to help the existing troops and local agencies in this challenging task.201 
As a first success, on 11 April, BiH authorities in cooperation with EUFOR troops 
confiscated 52kg of heroin with an estimated street value of several million 
Euros.202 
On 10 March 2005, the BiH Supreme Court confirmed charges against 
several high-ranking officials, accusing them of involvement in organized crime. 
One was Dragan Covic, the Croatian member of the three-headed BiH 
presidency. The indictment alleged that Covic, while he was the finance minister 
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of BiH, granted a company exemption from taxes, causing a loss of millions of 
convertible marks (KM), the official BiH currency. In addition, the indictment says 
that Covic received a one-million KM bribe from the company. Covic refused to 
step down and, consequently, on 29 March 2005, was removed from his post by 
the HR. Aware of the scope of his decision but needing to act against corruption, 
Paddy Ashdown was forced for the first time to use his Bonn Powers against the 
highest political institution in BiH.203   
 
H. FINDINGS 
It became obvious as early as spring 2004 that the EU would take on the 
responsibility in BiH to replace NATO’s forces with EUFOR by the end of the 
year. The final decision was made during the Istanbul Summit in June, six 
months before the transfer of authority. Most important, the EU and NATO 
agreed that operation Althea would be conducted using Berlin-Plus, the 
arrangement that had proven so extraordinarily successful in 2003 during 
operation Concordia in Macedonia. Consequently, the EU, again got access to 
NATO planning, assets and capabilities and to NATO headquarters. The 
agreement paved the way for the creation of a command and control structure for 
Althea like that of Concordia. Moreover, due to the EU’s early decision to take 
over from NATO, unlike operation Concordia, it was possible this time to consider 
the complete NATO operational planning process. In addition, important military 
structures, such as the EUSG in SHAPE, the EUCE at JFC Naples and the 
EUPT and EUFOR headquarters staff in Sarajevo – all consisting of NATO- and 
non-NATO EU officers – could be deployed early so that their personnel had 
enough time to familiarize themselves with their work and could prepare and plan 
Althea properly. Deficits that had been an issue during Concordia, such as 
double-hatted officers in the EUSG, unregulated security issues, and the 
exchange of information between NATO and EUFOR could be resolved in a 
timely fashion. In Sarajevo, both organizations are co-located in Camp Butmir 
and co-operate under the guideline: “One building – two headquarters, two 
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missions – one aim: to help the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”204 Finally, 
the vast majority of the countries that had supported SFOR decided to stay 
committed to BiH and maintain their national forces in the country under the 
EUFOR command. This whole process and development ensured a smooth and 
seamless transition between NATO and EUFOR.  
While NATO used a plain military approach to deal with the challenges 
and problems in BiH, to manage the crisis, and to stabilize the country, the EU 
selected a coherent approach based on close cooperation between a military 
force, EUFOR, and civilian actors in order to support the country’s social, 
political, and economic progress and to bring it closer to European integration. 
The EU approach reflects the current risk assessment:  stability in BiH is not 
threatened by combatants openly fighting each other, but rather by widespread 
corruption, organized crime, resistance to ethnic integration and the poor 
economic situation. None of those challenges can be tackled solely by a military 
force. In fact, a military force such as EUFOR can only act as a supporting factor 
to help the civilian institutions conduct their missions in a safe and secure 
environment. Consequently, EUFOR’s tasks – besides the original military task to 
maintain a durable cessation of hostilities by deterring the former Entity Armed 
Forces and other armed groups and to contribute to a safe and secure 
environment – contain mainly supportive tasks, including supporting the fight 
against organized crime and terrorism and supporting the hunt for and 
apprehension of war criminals.  
EUFOR’s force structure and composition certainly puts it in a good 
position to fulfill the given tasks. Considering the current situation in the country, 
the present number of soldiers, and the structure of the Multinational Task Forces 
ensure a capability to deter and to contribute to a secure environment so that 
other international actors can execute their missions safely. In addition, the same 
forces have the capability and manpower to support the hunt for and 
apprehension of war criminals. At present, open hostilities are not likely. But if the 
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situation in BiH should become unstable and the present European troops are 
not able to handle the situation, EUFOR can access operational reserve forces 
and, if necessary, strategic reserve forces in coordination and cooperation with 
NATO.  
By integrating the IPU, a flexible and versatile unit mostly consisting of 
Italian Carabinieri, and recently, parts of the Italian Alpini regiment, into the force 
structure, EUFOR added a capability to effectively support other international 
actors, like the EUPM, and local institutions in the fight against organized crime. 
First successes have already been achieved. 
If unrest arises among the population, it will most likely develop out of 
dissatisfaction with the domestic social or economical situation or out of disputes 
between the different ethnic groups. For EUFOR it is of the highest priority that 
possible unrest be discovered at the very outset. Consequently, it needs to have 
continuous situation awareness about the situation among the population. 
EUFOR needs to know about dissatisfaction, problems, and disputes among the 
population in order to induce appropriate measures. The deployment of LOTs 
among the population and the accommodation of those teams in residential 
areas has proven to be an excellent measure to “feel the pulse” of the people. 
The fact that the teams literally live among the locals builds trust and acceptance 
and creates open communication. They can identify possible problems before 
they develop into bigger disputes or unrest. However, the success of the LOTs 
depends very much on the team members and their capabilities. Their character, 
personality, and education are of the highest importance. These needs are fully 
reflected in the overarching EUFOR LOT concept that was introduced in early 
spring 2005. The concept stresses that only appropriate personnel with proper 
education and training must be deployed in the LOTs. The suggested training 
covers many important areas: the history of BiH, including an overview of the 
war, the current social, political, and economical situation in the country, as well 
as the structure of other significant international organizations that operate in the 
country. The whole concept ensures that the selected personnel will be well 
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prepared to fulfill their important and highly challenging task with regard to 
maintaining EUFOR’s situation awareness. 
The coherent EU approach to tackle the problems inside BiH as well as 
the “excellent cooperation between the High Representative and EUFOR”205 was 
impressively demonstrated shortly after EUFOR took over from SFOR. The 
operation that ended with the sealing of Bosnian Serb military underground 
facilities, associated with Paddy Ashdown`s political measures against the 
Republika Srpska on 16 December 2004, is one example of a synchronized use 
of military and political means to achieve coherent results. In addition, that early 
demonstration of EUFOR’s capabilities immediately established the visibility and 
authority of EUFOR and made a positive early impact both nationally and 
internationally.206 In fact, after almost ten years, the Republika Srpska 
transferred a war criminal to The Hague in mid January 2005 and by the end of 
March several former army generals had surrendered voluntarily to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague.  
These successes are certainly significant first steps toward overcoming 
the war criminal problem. However, so long as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko 
Mladic remain free this issue will remain a barrier for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 
its way to European integration. Moreover, as the action of the High 
Representative against the Croatian part of the BiH presidency on 29 March 
suggests, corruption and organized crime remains a major problem for the future 
development of the country and are likely to require strong and concerted action 
on the part of the EU, including EUFOR, EUPM and the local authorities.207 
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VI. CONCLUSION  
Within the last seven years, the EU has put enormous effort into the 
development of a credible European Security and Defense Policy. It created a 
political-military framework that is strongly comparable to the proven framework 
of NATO. The Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, and 
the EU Military Staff form a structure that serves as a solid base for EU-led 
military operations under political control and with broad military expertise.  The 
2003 Berlin-Plus arrangement reflects the close relation and connection between 
NATO and the EU and represents a milestone for the EU becoming operational. 
The arrangement gives the EU the possibility to use NATO’s integrated military 
command structure, its assets, and its planning. The European Capabilities 
Action Plan, the Headline Goal 2010, and the European Security Strategy 
demonstrate that the EU is aware of its weaknesses in military capabilities and of 
its political and military responsibilities and that it is willing to tackle the existing 
shortfalls in the fields of deployability, mobility, sustainability, effective 
engagement, and C4ISR. Certainly, these deficits still hamper the EU from taking 
on high-intensity military operations. However, they will have no considerable 
effect on the low-intensity operation Althea. Moreover, the dynamic development 
and improvement of the ESDP since 1998, results that have been achieved in a 
comparatively short period of time, clearly demonstrate and prove the strong will 
of the EU to face and to overcome existing and future challenges. 
The first EU-led military mission, operation Concordia, concluded 
successfully in December 2003, demonstrated that the EU is able to deploy a 
capable military force. The EU’s political-military framework demonstrated its 
competence. And the Berlin-Plus arrangement, also used for the first time, 
proved to be an outstanding and extremely effective tool for an EU-led operation. 
EU military command elements were successfully integrated into NATO 
headquarters on various levels. In addition, NATO allowed the EU access to 
NATO assets and planning. The minor problems that were identified arose mainly 
from still unregulated procedures between NATO and the EU in regard to security 
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issues or because of the extremely short timeframe for preparation of the 
mission. None of the challenges threatened the operation; indeed, most of them 
were resolved during the mission. The EU’s approach in dealing with the 
challenges inside Macedonia proved to be extremely useful. The deployment of 
liaison teams and their accommodation in rented houses among the local 
population quickly created an atmosphere of trust and confidence and was one 
key to the success of the EU’s contribution to the return of stability in Macedonia.  
An analysis of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s history, especially its 
development after Tito’s death, the war and the development after Dayton 
demonstrates, ethnicity is of prime importance and hugely significant to the 
people and society of the country. Its ethnic division has always been a major 
challenge. The devastating 1990s war that was ended by the Dayton Accords in 
December 1995 demonstrated how deep the hatred and ethnic division was. 
When the Dayton Accords succeeded in creating peace and internal stability, the 
military troops could be significantly reduced from approximately 60,000 in 1995 
to approximately 7,000 troops today. Dayton failed, however, in creating a state.  
The Constitution designed for BiH by the Accords supported the ethnic division of 
the country and created a weak overarching state that was hardly able to enforce 
decisions against the will of any ethnic group. Progress could only be achieved 
by giving the High Representative the extraordinary Bonn Powers. And still, BiH 
remains ethnically divided. The nationalistic parties that were responsible for the 
outbreak of the war are still the main political players and the entities, particularly 
the Republika Srpska, still do not fully cooperate with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague. The fact that war criminals 
such as Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic are still not transferred to The 
Hague is a major barrier to ethnic integration. The population’s resistance to 
ethnic integration and the lack of a common Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
consciousness hampers social, political, and economical progress and, 
consequently, paves the way for widespread corruption and organized crime. 
Today, fights between combatants are unlikely. However, the current domestic 
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situation could easily lead to disputes among the people, particularly between 
different ethnic groups, and, consequently, to social unrest.  
The EU chose a coherent approach based on close cooperation between 
their military force, EUFOR, and the involved domestic and international civilian 
institutions and organizations to tackle Bosnia and Herzegovina’s social, political, 
and economic problems. This overarching approach reflects the current risk 
assessment because the country’s stability and progress is no longer threatened 
by open fights between combatants but by widespread corruption, organized 
crime, resistance to ethnic integration, and the poor economic situation. 
EUFOR’s tasks, therefore, in addition to the military tasks outlined in Annex 1a 
and 2 of the Dayton Accords, contain mainly supportive tasks, including 
supporting the fight against organized crime and terrorism as well as supporting 
the hunt for and apprehension of war criminals. Unlike operation Concordia in 
Macedonia, EUFOR had sufficient time to prepare for this challenging mission. 
Operation Althea was planned thoroughly and the key military personnel were 
deployed in a timely fashion. Again, the EU made use of the highly valuable 
Berlin-Plus arrangement and established the military command and control 
structure that had proven so successful during Concordia. Deficits that were an 
issue during the Macedonia operation such as double-hatted officers in the EU 
Staff Group, unregulated security issues, and the problematic exchange of 
information between NATO and EUFOR could be resolved early. Moreover, the 
military structure of EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina takes the domestic 
situation into account properly. With their three Multinational Task Forces, 
EUFOR has sufficient power to deter and ensure a secure environment and to 
support the hunt for and the apprehension of war criminals. Operational and 
strategic reserve forces are on stand-by to give EUFOR military back-up if 
necessary. Furthermore, a versatile and flexible Integrated Police Unit enables 
EUFOR to support local institutions and organizations in the fight against 
organized crime and the Liaison Observation Team concept has proven to be the 
proper approach to ensure the maintenance of the highly important Situation 
Awareness. 
94 
This analysis of the development of the European Security and Defense 
Policy, its conceptual and institutional achievements, military capabilities, and 
recent experience in Macedonia, associated with the current challenges in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the approach of the EU and its military forces to 
tackle the current challenges suggests that EUFOR will successfully implement 
the Dayton Accords. The results that have already been achieved since the 
transfer of authority from SFOR to EUFOR on 2 December 2004 emphatically 
support this conclusion. However, time will tell if the implementation of the 
Dayton Accords is sufficient to bring Bosnia and Herzegovina closer to European 
integration. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton stated this point precisely in his 
speech on 14 December 1995: “no foreign power can guarantee that Muslims, 
Croats, and Serbs can live in Bosnia and Herzegovina as free citizens in one 
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